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Abstract
I study the problem of social learning in a model where agents move sequentially. Each agent receives
a private signal about the underlying state of the world, observes the past actions in a neighborhood
of individuals, and chooses her action attempting to match the true state. Existing literature shows
that with unbounded private beliefs, asymptotic learning occurs if and only if agents observe a close
predecessor. However, a prevailing assumption in these studies is that the observation structure is
exogenous. In contrast to most of the previous literature, I assume in this paper that observation is
endogenous and costly. More specifically, each agent must pay a cost to make any observation and can
strategically choose the set of actions to observe privately. I introduce the notion of maximal learning
(relative to cost) as a natural extension of asymptotic learning: society achieves maximal learning when
agents can learn the true state with probability 1 in the limit after paying the cost. I show that observing
only a close predecessor is no longer sufficient for learning the true state with unbounded private beliefs
and positive costs. Instead, maximal learning occurs if and only if the size of the observations extends
to infinity.
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1 Introduction
How do people aggregate dispersed information? Imagine a scenario with a large number of
agents, each trying to match her action with some underlying state of the world, e.g., consumers
choosing the highest quality product, firms implementing the technology with the highest pro-
ductivity, etc. On one hand, each agent may have some informative but noisy private signal
about the particular state; combining all the signals will yield sufficient information for the
entire society to learn the true state. However, such private signals are typically not directly
observable to others; in other words, information is decentralized. On the other hand, an agent’s
action is observable and informative regarding her knowledge; thus, by observing one another,
agents can still hope for some level of information aggregation. Therefore, it is of great im-
portance to investigate the relation between the type of observation structure and the type of
information aggregation that is achievable.
A large and growing literature has studied this problem of learning via observation. Renowned
early research, such as Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch[8], Banerjee[6] and Smith and
Sorensen[28], demonstrate that efficient information aggregation may fail in a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of a dynamic game, i.e., when agents act sequentially and observe the actions of all
their predecessors, they may eventually “herd” on the wrong action. In a more recent paper,
Acemoglu et al.[1] consider a more general, and stochastic observation structure. They point
out that society’s learning of the true state depends on two factors: the possibility of arbitrarily
strong private signals (unbounded private beliefs), and the nonexistence of excessively influen-
tial individuals (expanding observations). Expanding observations refer to the condition that
in the limit, each agent observes the action of some predecessor whose position in the decision
sequence is not particularly far from her own. In particular, Acemoglu et al.[1] show that when
private beliefs are unbounded, a necessary and sufficient condition for agents to undertake the
correct action almost certainly in a large society is expanding observations.
In the studies discussed above and many other related works, a common modeling assump-
tion is that the network of observation is exogenous: agents are not able to choose whose actions
to observe or whether to observe at all. In practice, however, observation is typically both costly
and strategic. First, time and resources are required to obtain information regarding others’
actions. Second, an agent would naturally choose to observe what are presumably more infor-
mative actions based on the positions of individuals in the decision sequence. In this paper, I
analyze an endogenous network formation framework where the choice of observation depends
on the private signal, and address how it affects the aggregation of equilibrium information.
The outline of the model can be illustrated with the following example. Consider a firm fac-
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ing the choice between two new technologies, and the productivity of these technologies cannot
be perfectly determined until they are implemented. The firm has two sources of information to
help guide its decision as to which technology to implement: privately received news regarding
the productivity of the two technologies, on the one hand, and observing other firms’ choices,
on the other. The firm knows the approximate timing of those choices, but there is no direct
communication: it is unable to obtain the private information of others and can know only
which technology they have chosen. Moreover, observation is costly and is also a part of the
firm’s decision problem – the firm must decide whether to make an investment to set up a
survey group or hire an outside agent to investigate other firms’ choices. If it chooses to engage
in observation, the firm must decide which of the other firms it would like to observe because
there is likely a constraint on how much information can be gathered within a limited time and
with limited resources. A similar example would be the choice of a consumer between two new
products (e.g. two new smartphones). In this case, the consumer cares about which product
has higher quality, and faces the problem of whether to spend time and effort (e.g. on an online
forum) collecting information about other consumers’ choices before she makes her own.
More formally, there is an underlying state of the world in the model, which is binary in
value. A large number of agents sequentially choose between two actions with the goal of
matching their action with the true state. Each agent receives a private signal regarding what
the true state is, but the signal is not perfectly revealing. In addition, after receiving her signal,
each agent can pay a cost to observe a number of her predecessors, i.e., to connect with a certain
neighborhood1. Exactly which of the predecessors to observe is the agent’s strategic choice, and
the number of others to observe is limited by an exogenous capacity structure. By observing a
predecessor, the agent knows the action of the other, but not the other’s private signal or which
agents that have been observed by the other2. After this process of information gathering, the
agent makes her own choice.
In the present paper, I address the central question in this line of research under the new
context of endogenous network formation, i.e., when can agents achieve the highest possible
level of learning (taking the right action)? In the literature, this scenario is referred to as
asymptotic learning, which means that the true state is revealed in the limit, and that infor-
mation aggregation in equilibrium would be the same as if all private information were public.
When observation is endogenous, asymptotic learning may never occur in any equilibrium (e.g.,
1For the main part of the paper, the observation cost is assumed to be fixed. The more general case where
the cost depends on the number of observations is discussed in Section 6.
2If observing an agent also reveals her observation, there exists information diffusion in the game. In the
present paper, I discuss this case after presenting the main results.
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when the cost of observation is too high for a rational agent to acquire information). Hence,
asymptotic learning no longer characterizes the upper bound of social learning with endogenous
observation. I therefore generalize the notion of the highest equilibrium learning probability to
maximal learning, which means that, in the limit, information aggregation in equilibrium would
be the same as it would be if an agent could pay to access and observe all prior private infor-
mation. In fact, maximal learning reduces to asymptotic learning when the cost of observation
is 0 or when private beliefs are relatively weak with respect to cost.
There are thus two central factors determining the type of learning achievable in equilibrium.
The first is the relative precision of the private signal, which is represented by the relation
between the likelihood ratio and the cost of observation. Consider a hypothetical scenario in
which an agent can pay to directly observe the true state. If a private signal indicates that
the costly acquisition of the true state is not worthwhile, then the agents have strong private
beliefs; otherwise, they have weak private beliefs. The extreme case of strong private belief is
unbounded private belief, i.e., the likelihood ratio may approach infinity and is not bounded
away from zero. If the likelihood ratio is always finite and bounded away from zero, then
the agents have bounded private beliefs. Note that bounded private belief can also be strong,
depending on the cost. The second key factor is the capacity structure, which describes the
maximum number of observations for each agent. I say that the capacity structure has infinite
observations when the number of observations goes to infinity as the size of the society becomes
arbitrarily large; otherwise, the capacity structure has finite observations. Infinite observations
imply that the influence of any one agent’s action on the others becomes trivial as the size of
the society grows because that action only accounts for an arbitrarily small part of the observed
neighborhood.
The main results of this paper are presented in two theorems. Theorem 1 posits that when
the cost of observation is zero and agents have unbounded private beliefs, asymptotic learning
occurs in every equilibrium. As discussed above, the previous literature has shown that a
necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic learning under unbounded private beliefs is
expanding observations. This theorem implies that when observation can be strategically chosen
with zero cost, the condition of expanding observations becomes a property that is automatically
satisfied in every equilibrium, i.e., every rational agent will choose to observe at least some
action of a close predecessor. This can be regarded as a micro-foundation for the prevalence of
expanding observations when observation is free.
Theorem 2 is this paper’s most substantive contribution and demonstrates that a sufficient
and necessary condition for maximal learning is infinite observations when cost is positive and
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private beliefs are strong. Multiple implications can be drawn from this result. First, when
cost is positive and private beliefs are strong, asymptotic learning is impossible because there
is always a positive probability that an agent chooses not to observe. In other words, maximal
learning marks the upper bound of social learning. Second, to achieve maximal learning, this
theorem implies that no agent can be significantly influential at all, which contrasts sharply
with the results in the previous literature. No matter how large the society is, an agent can
no longer know the true state by observing a bounded number of actions (even if they are
actions by close predecessors); however, an agent can and only can do so via observing an
arbitrarily large neighborhood. Each agent makes a mistake with positive probability (when
he decides not to observe), but efficient information aggregation occurs when the influence of
any agent is arbitrarily small. The intuition behind this statement is that given any observed
neighborhood, adding a different and sufficiently large neighborhood to it is always an ex ante
strict improvement on the posterior belief about the true state. Third, this result leads to a
number of interesting comparative statics. For instance, in the limit, the equilibrium learning
probability (the probability that an agent’s action is correct) may be higher when the cost is
positive than when the cost is zero and may be higher when private beliefs become weaker.
Fourth, this theorem facilitates several important variations of the model. For instance, it can
be shown that the pattern of social learning would be much different if endogenous observation
preceded private signal, in contrast to the existing literature where this order of information
makes no difference when observation is exogenous. In addition, a partial characterization of
the level of social learning can be obtained under a more general cost structure.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review of the related
literature. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 defines the equilibrium and each type of
learning that is discussed in this paper and characterizes the equilibrium behavior. Sections
5 to 7 present the main results and their implications, in addition to a number of extensions.
Section 8 concludes. All the proofs are included in the Appendix.
2 Literature Review
A large and growing literature studies the problem of social learning by Bayesian agents who
can observe others’ choices. This literature begins with Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch[8]
and Banerjee[6], who first formalize the problem systematically and concisely and point to
information cascades as the cause of herding behavior. In their models, the informativeness
of the observed action history outweighs that of any private signal with a positive probability,
and herding occurs as a result. Smith and Sorensen[28] propose a comprehensive model of a
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similar environment with a more general signal structure, and show that apart from the usual
herding behavior, a new robust possibility of confounded learning occurs when agents have
heterogeneous preferences: they neither learn the true state asymptotically nor herd on the
same action. Smith and Sorensen[28] clearly distinguish “private” belief that is given by private
signals and “public” belief that is given by observation, and they also introduce the concepts
of bounded and unbounded private beliefs, whose meaning and importance were discussed
above. These seminal papers, along with the general discussion by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer
and Welch[9], assume that agents can observe the entire previous decision history, i.e., the whole
ordered set of choices of their predecessors. This assumption can be regarded as an extreme
case of exogenous network structure. In related contributions to the literature, such as Lee[24],
Banerjee[7] and Celen and Kariv[13], agents may not observe the entire decision history, but
exogenously given observation remains a common assumption.
A more recent paper, Acemoglu et al.[1], studies the environment where each agent receives
a private signal about the underlying state of the world and observes (some of) their prede-
cessors’ actions according to a general stochastic network topology. Their main result states
that when the private signal structure features unbounded belief, asymptotic learning occurs in
each equilibrium if and only if the observation structure exhibits expanding observations. Other
recent research in this area include Banerjee and Fudenberg[5], Gale and Kariv[18], Callander
and Horner[11] and Smith and Sorensen[29], which differ from Acemoglu et al.[1] mainly in
making alternative assumption for observation, i.e., that agents only observe the number of
others taking each available action but not the positions of the observed agents in the decision
sequence. However, all these papers also share the assumption of exogenous observation that is
shared in the earlier literature discussed above.
The key difference between my paper and the literature discussed above is that observation
is costly and strategic. First, each agent can choose whether to pay to acquire more information
about the underlying state via observation. If the private signal is rather strong or the cost
of observation is too high, an agent may rationally choose not to observe at all. Second, upon
paying the cost, each agent can choose exactly which actions are included in the observation
up to an exogenously given capacity constraint. In this way, society’s observation network is
endogenously formed, and hence we can examine not only the rational choice of action to match
the true state but also the rational choice of whether to observe and which actions to observe
as a cost-efficient decision regarding the acquisition of additional information.
There have been several recent papers that discuss the impact of costly observation on
social learning. In Kultti and Miettinen[22][23], both the underlying state and the private
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signal are binary, and an agent pay a cost for each action she observes. In Celen[12], the signal
structure is similar to the general one adopted in this paper, but it is assumed that an agent
can pay a cost to observe the entire action history before her. My model can be regarded as
a richer treatment as compared to those papers, in the sense that it allows for a wide range of
signal strucutures, as well as the possibility that agents would have to strategically choose a
proper subset of their predecessors’ actions to observe3. More importantly, this paper provides
necessary and sufficient conditions for social learning to reach its theoretical upper bound under
costly observation, which is a central question that remains unanswered in previous research.
Some of the major findings in the above cited works, for example the existence of cost may lead
to welfare improvement, are confirmed in this paper as well.
Another branch of the literature introduces a costly and strategic choice into the decision
process – each agent can pay to acquire an informative signal, or to “search”, i.e., sample an
available option and know its value. Notable works in this area include Hendricks, Sorensen
and Wiseman[20], Mueller-Frank and Pai[25] and Ali[2]. My paper differs from this stream of
the literature in two aspects. On one hand, in those papers, the observation structure – the
neighborhood that each agent observes – remains exogenous. In addition, agents in their models
can obtain direct information about the true state such as signal or value of an option, whereas
agents in the present paper can only acquire indirect information (others’ actions) by paying
the applicable cost.
There is also a well-known literature on non-Bayesian learning in social networks. In these
models, rather than applying Bayes’ update to obtain the posterior belief regarding the under-
lying state of the world by using all the available information, agents may adopt some intuitive
rule of thumb to guide their choices (Ellison and Fudenberg[16][17]), only update their beliefs
according to part of their information (Bala and Goyal[3][4]), or be subject to a certain bias
in interpreting information (DeMarzo, Vayanos and Zwiebel[15]). Despite the various ways to
model non-Bayesian learning, it is still common to assume that the network topology is exoge-
nous. In terms of results, Golub and Jackson[19] utilize a similar implication to that of Theorem
2 in this paper: they assume that agents naively update beliefs by taking weighted averages of
their neighbors’ beliefs and show that a necessary and sufficient condition for complete social
learning (almost certain knowledge of the true state in a large and connected society over time)
is that the weight put on each neighbor converges to zero for each agent as the size of the society
increases.
3For the main parts of this paper, agents are assumed to pay a single cost for observation, but in a later
section I also present results regarding a more general cost function, which is non-decreasing in the number of
actions observed.
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Finally, the importance of observational learning via networks has been well documented in
both empirical and experimental studies. Conley and Udry[14] and Munshi[27] both focus on the
adoption of new agricultural technology and not only support the importance of observational
learning but also indicate that observation is often constrained because a farmer may not be
able, in practice, to receive information regarding the choice of every other farmer in the area.
Munshi[26] and Ioannides and Loury[21] demonstrate that social networks play an important
role in individuals’ information acquisition regarding employment. Cai, Chen and Fang[10]
conduct a natural field experiment to indicate the empirical significance of observational learning
in which consumers obtain information about product quality from the purchasing decisions of
others.
3 Model
3.1 Private Signal Structure
Consider a group of countably infinite agents: N = {1, 2, ...}. Let θ ∈ {0, 1} be the state of
the world with equal prior probabilities, i.e., Prob(θ = 0) = Prob(θ = 1) = 12 . Given θ, each
agent observes an i.i.d. private signal sn ∈ S = (−1, 1), where S is the set of possible signals.
The probability distributions regarding the signal conditional on the state are denoted as F0(s)
and F1(s) (with continuous density functions f0(s) and f1(s)). The pair of measures (F0, F1)
is referred to as the signal structure, and I assume that the signal structure has the following
properties:
1. The pdfs f0(s) and f1(s) are continuous and non-zero everywhere on the support, which
immediately implies that no signal is fully revealing regarding the underlying state.
2. Monotone likelihood ratio property (MLRP): f1(s)
f0(s)
is strictly increasing in s. This assumption
is made without loss of generality: as long as no two signals generate the same likelihood ratio,
the signals can always be re-aligned to form a structure that satisfies the MLRP.
3. Symmetry: f1(s) = f0(−s) for any s. This assumption can be interpreted as indicating that
the signal structure is unbiased. In other words, the distribution of an agent’s private belief,
which is determined by the likelihood ratio, would be symmetric between the two states.
Assumption 3 is strong compared with the other two assumptions. Nevertheless, many
results in this paper can be easily generalized in an environment with an arbitrarily asymmetric
signal structure. For those that do rely on symmetry, the requirement is not strict – the results
will hold as long as f1(s) and f0(−s) do not differ by very much, and an agent’s equilibrium
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behavior is similar when receiving s and −s for a large proportion of private signals s ∈ (−1, 1).
Therefore, the symmetry of signal structure serves as a simplification of a more general condition,
whose essential elements are similar (in a symmetric sense) private signal distributions and
similar equilibrium behavior under the two states.
3.2 The Sequential Decision Process
The agents sequentially make a single action each between 0 and 1, where the order of agents
is common knowledge. Let an ∈ {0, 1} denote agent n’s decision. The payoff of agent n is
un(an, θ) =


1, if an = θ;
0, otherwise.
After receiving her private information and before engaging in the above action, an agent
may acquire information about others from a network of observation4. In contrast with much
of the literature on social learning, I assume that the network topology is not exogenously given
but endogenously formed. Each agent n can pay a cost c ≥ 0 to obtain a capacity K(n) ∈ N;
otherwise, he pays nothing and chooses ∅. I assume that the number of agents whose capacity
is zero is finite, i.e., there exists N ∈ N such that K(n) > 0 for all n > N .
With capacity K(n), agent n can select a neighborhood B(n) ⊂ {1, 2, · · · , n− 1} of at most
K(n) size, i.e., |B(n)| ≤ K(n), and observe the action of each agent in B(n). The actions in
B(n) are observed at the same time, and no agent can choose any additional observation based
on what she has already observed. Let B(n) be the set of all possible neighborhoods of at most
K(n) size (including the empty neighborhood) for agent n. We say that there is a link between
agent n and every agent in the neighborhood that n observes. By the definition set forth above,
a link in the network is directed, i.e., unilaterally formed, and without affecting the observed
agent. I refer to the set {K(n)}∞n=1 as the capacity structure, and I define a useful property for
it below.
Definition 1. A capacity structure {K(n)}∞n=1 has infinite observations if
lim
n→∞
K(n) =∞.
If the capacity structure does not satisfy this property, then we say it has finite observations.
Example 1. Some typical capacity structures are described below:
1. K(n) = n − 1 for all n: each agent can pay the cost to observe the entire previous decision
history, which conforms to the early literature on social learning.
4In Section 7.1, I will discuss the case involving an alternative order in which observation of actions takes
place before a realization of private signal.
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2. K(n) = 1 for all n: each agent can observe only one of her predecessors. If observation
is concentrated on one agent, the network becomes a star; at the other extreme, if each agent
observes her immediate predecessor, the network becomes a line.
In between the above two extreme examples is the general case that K(n) ∈ (1, n−1) for all
n: each agent can, at a cost, observe an ordered sample of her choice among her predecessors.
Note that a capacity structure featuring infinite observations requires only that the sample size
grows without bound as the society becomes large but does not place any more restrictions on
the sample construction. As will be shown in the subsequent analysis, this condition on sample
size alone plays a key role in determining the achievable level of social learning.
An agent’s strategy in the above sequential game consists of two problems: (1) given her
private signal, whether to make costly observation and, if yes, whom to observe; (2) after
observation (or not), which action to take between 0 and 1. Let Hn(B(n)) = {am ∈ {0, 1} :
m ∈ B(n)} denote the set of actions that n can possibly observe from B(n) and let hn(B(n)) be
a particular action sequence in Hn(B(n)). Let In(B(n)) = {sn, hn(B(n))} be n’s information
set, given B(n). Agent n’s information set is her private information and cannot be observed
by others5. The set of all possible information sets of n is denoted as In = {In(B(n)) : B(n) ⊂
{1, 2, · · · , n− 1}, |B(n)| ≤ K(n)}.
A strategy for n is the set of two mappings σn = (σ
1
n, σ
2
n), where σ
1
n : S → B(n) selects n’s
choice of observation for every possible private signal, and σ2n : In → {0, 1} selects a decision for
every possible information set. A strategy profile is a sequence of strategies σ = {σn}n∈N. I use
σ−n = {σ1, · · · , σn−1, σn+1, · · · } to denote the strategies of all agents other than n. Therefore,
for any n, σ = (σn, σ−n).
3.3 Strong and Weak Private Beliefs
An agent’s private belief given signal s is defined as the conditional probability of the true
state being 1, i.e., f1(s)
f0(s)+f1(s)
. Note that it is a function of s only, since it does not depend on
the agents’ actions. I now define several categories of private beliefs that will be useful in the
subsequent analysis. The notions unbounded and bounded private beliefs follow from the existing
literature; the notions strong and weak private beliefs are applicable for costly observation in
particular.
5In Section 7.2, I will discuss the scenario with information diffusion, i.e., hn(B(n)) can also be observed by
creating a link with agent n.
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1. Agents have unbounded private beliefs if
lim
s→1
f1(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
= 1
lim
s→−1
f1(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
= 0.
Agents have bounded private beliefs if
lim
s→1
f1(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
< 1
lim
s→−1
f1(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
> 0.
The above definitions of unbounded and bounded private beliefs are standard in the previous
literature and do not depend on the cost of observation c.
2. When c > 0, agents have strong private beliefs if there is s∗ < 1 and s∗ > −1 such that
f1(s
∗)
f1(s∗) + f0(s∗)
= 1− c
f0(s∗)
f1(s∗) + f0(s∗)
= 1− c.
Given the symmetry assumption in the private signal structure, s∗ = −s∗. Agents have weak
private beliefs if the above defined s∗ and s∗ do not exist.
Strong and weak private beliefs describe the relation between such private beliefs and the cost
of observation. When an agent has strong private beliefs, she is not willing to pay the cost c
for a range of extreme private signals, even if doing so guarantees the knowledge of the true
state of the world. In other words, private signals may have sufficiently high informativeness to
render costly observation unnecessary. The opposite is weak private beliefs, in which case an
agent always prefers observation when it contains enough information about the true state.
It is clear that unbounded private belief implies strong private belief for any positive cost.
In the subsequent analysis, we will see that properties of private beliefs play an important role
in the type of observational learning that can be achieved. To make the problem interesting, I
assume that c < 12 ; in other words, an agent will never choose not to observe merely because
the cost is too high.
4 Equilibrium and Learning
4.1 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Given a strategy profile, the sequence of decisions {an}n∈N and the network topology (i.e., the
sequence of the observed neighborhood) {B(n)}n∈N are both stochastic processes. I denote the
probability measure generated by these stochastic processes as Pσ and Qσ correspondingly.
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Figure 1: Illustration of Network Topology
Figure 1 illustrates the world from the perspective of agent 5, who knows her private signal
s5, her capacity K(5), and the possible observation behavior of predecessors 1− 4 (denoted by
different colors). If agent 5 knows the strategies of her predecessors, some possible behaviors
may be excluded, e.g., agent 3 may never observe agent 1.
Definition 2. A strategy profile σ∗ is a pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium if for
each n ∈ N, σ∗n is such that given σ
∗
−n, (1) σ
∗2
n (In) maximizes the expected payoff of n given
every In ∈ In; (2) σ
∗1
n (sn) maximizes the expected payoff of n, given every sn and given σ
∗2
n .
For any equilibrium σ∗, agent n first solves
max
y∈{0,1}
Pσ∗−n(y = θ|sn, hn(B(n)))
for any sn ∈ (−1, 1) and any observed action sequence hn(B(n)) from any B(n) ⊂ {1, · · · , n−1}
satisfying |B(n)| ≤ K(n). This maximization problem has a solution for each agent n because
it is a binary choice problem. Denote the solution to this problem as y∗n(sn, hn(B(n))). Then,
agent n solves
max
B(n)⊂{1,··· ,n−1}:|B(n)|≤K(n)
E[Pσ∗−n(y
∗
n(sn, hn(B(n))) = θ|sn, hn(B(n)))|sn]
This is, once again, a problem of discrete choice. Hence, given an indifference-breaking rule,
there is a solution for every sn. Finally, if the difference between the maximized expected
probability of taking the correct action with observation and that without observation exceeds
the cost of observation c, then the agent chooses to observe (the observed neighborhood being the
solution to the above problem); otherwise, she chooses not to observe. Proceeding inductively
for each agent determines an equilibrium.
Note that the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium does not depend on the assump-
tion of a symmetric signal structure. However, this assumption guarantees the existence of a
symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium, i.e., an equilibrium σ∗ in which, for each sn ∈ [0, 1),
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σ∗1n (sn) = σ
∗1
n (−sn). In other words, when the optimal neighborhood to observe (including
the empty neighborhood, i.e., not to observe any predecessor) in equilibrium σ∗ is the same for
every agent n, given any pair of private signals, sn and −sn, then σ
∗ is a symmetric equilibrium.
In fact, if the optimal observed neighborhood is unique for each agent and every private signal,
then each perfect Bayesian equilibrium will be symmetric. For instance, if for some private
signal s4 > 0, the unique optimal neighborhood for agent 4 to observe is {2, 3}, then due to the
symmetric signal structure, it must also be her unique optimal neighborhood to observe when
her private signal is −s4. In the remainder of the paper, the analysis focuses on pure strategy
symmetric Bayesian equilibria, and henceforth I simply refer to them as “equilibria”. I note the
existence of equilibrium below.
Proposition 1. There exists a pure strategy symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
As discussed briefly above, I will clearly identify which results can be generalized to an
environment with asymmetric private signal distributions (and thus with asymmetric equilibria).
4.2 Characterization of Individual Behavior
My first results show that equilibrium individual decisions regarding whether to observe can be
represented by an interval on the support of private signal.
Proposition 2. When c > 0, then in every equilibrium σ∗, for every n ∈ N:
1. For any s1n > s
2
n ≥ 0 (or s
1
n < s
2
n ≤ 0), if σ
∗1
n (s
1
n) 6= ∅, then σ
∗1
n (s
2
n) 6= ∅.
2. Pσ∗(an = θ|sn) is weakly increasing (weakly decreasing) in sn for all non-negative (non-
positive) sn such that σ
∗1
n (sn) 6= ∅.
3. There is one and only one signal sn∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that σ
∗1
n (sn) 6= ∅ if sn ∈ [0, s
n
∗ ) (if
sn ∈ (−s
n
∗ , 0]) and σ
∗1
n (sn) = ∅ if sn > s
n
∗ (if sn < −s
n
∗).
This proposition shows that observation is more favorable for an agent with a weaker signal,
which is intuitive because information acquired from observation is relatively more important
when an agent is less confident about her private information. The proposition then implies that
for any agent n, there is one and only one non-negative cut-off signal in [0, 1], which is denoted
as sn∗ , such that agent n will choose to observe in equilibrium if sn ∈ [0, s
n
∗ ) and not to observe if
sn > s
n
∗ . It is also clear that when s
n
∗ ∈ (0, 1), agent n must be indifferent between observing and
not observing at sn = s
n
∗ . Under the symmetry assumption regarding the signal structure, the
case when the private signal is non-positive is analogous. Figure 2 below illustrates the behavior
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Figure 2: Equilibrium Behavior of Agent n
of agent n in equilibrium; note that when agent n chooses to observe, the exact neighborhood
observed may depend on her private signal sn.
The second implication of this proposition is that the learning probability (i.e., the proba-
bility of taking the correct action) has a nice property of monotonicity when the agent observes
a non-empty neighborhood. When he chooses not to observe, i.e., when sn > s
n
∗ (sn < −s
n
∗ ),
the probability of taking the correct action is also increasing (decreasing) in sn because the
probability is simply equal to f1(sn)
f0(sn)+f1(sn)
( f0(sn)
f0(sn)+f1(sn)
). However, this monotonicity is not
preserved from observing to not observing because observation is costly and an agent with a
stronger signal may be content with a lower learning probability to save on costs. Figure 3 below
shows the shape of this probability with respect to sn. Of the two continuous curves, the top
curve depicts the probability of taking the correct action if agent n always observes (denoted
P (an = θ|O)), whereas the bottom curve illustrates the probability of taking the correct action
if agent n never observes (denoted P (an = θ|NO)). The solid “broken” curve measures the
learning probability in equilibrium. The difference between the two continuous curves is greater
than c at sn ∈ [0, s
n
∗ ) (and sn ∈ (−s
n
∗ , 0]), less than c at sn > s
n
∗ (and sn < −s
n
∗ ), and equal to
c at sn = s
n
∗ (and sn = −s
n
∗ ).
4.3 Learning
The main focus of this paper is to determine what type of information aggregation will result
from equilibrium behavior. First, I define the different types of learning studied in this paper.
Definition 3. Given a signal structure (F0, F1), we say that asymptotic learning occurs in
equilibrium σ∗ if an converges to θ in probability: limn→∞Pσ∗(an = θ) = 1.
Next, I define maximal learning, which is a natural extension of asymptotic learning. Be-
14
Figure 3: Equilibrium Learning Probability for Agent n
fore the formal definition, I introduce an intermediate and conceptual term: suppose that a
hypothetical agent can learn the true state by paying cost c. Clearly, an optimal strategy of
this agent is to pay c and learn the true state if and only if her private signal lies in some
interval (s, s¯) (this interval is equal to (s∗, s
∗) when private beliefs are strong and (−1, 1) when
private beliefs are weak). Let P ∗(c) denote her probability of taking the right action under this
strategy.
Definition 4. Given a signal structure (F0, F1) and a cost of observation c, we say that maxi-
mal learning occurs in equilibrium σ∗ if the probability of an being the correct action converges
to P ∗(c): limn→∞Pσ∗(an = θ) = P
∗(c).
Asymptotic learning requires that the unconditional probability of taking the correct action
converges to 1, i.e., the posterior beliefs converge to a degenerate distribution on the true state.
In terms of information aggregation, asymptotic learning can be interpreted as equivalent to
making all private signals public and thus aggregating information efficiently. It marks the upper
bound of social learning with an exogenous observation structure. However, when observation
becomes endogenous, it is notable that asymptotic learning is impossible in certain cases. For
instance, consider the case when cost is positive and private beliefs are strong. Indeed, because
there is now a range of signals (to be precise, two intervals of extreme signals) such that an
agent would not be willing to pay the cost even to know the true state with certainty, there
is always the probability of making a mistake when the private signal falls into such a range.
Therefore, an alternative notion is needed to characterize a more appropriate upper bound of
social learning, which could theoretically be reached in some equilibrium. Maximal learning, as
defined above, serves this purpose.
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Maximal learning extends the notion of efficient information aggregation to an environment
in which information acquisition is costly and means that, in the limit, agents can learn the
true state as if they can pay the cost of observation to access all prior private signals, i.e.,
efficient information aggregation can be achieved at a price. From the perspective of equilibrium
behavior, maximal learning occurring in an equilibrium implies that, in the limit, an agent will
almost certainly take the right action whenever she chooses to observe. The term P ∗(c) is less
than 1 when private beliefs are strong6 because an agent may choose not to observe when her
private signal is highly informative. It is equal to 1 when c = 0 or when private beliefs are weak.
In other words, maximal learning reduces to asymptotic learning in these two circumstances.
The goal of this paper is then to characterize conditions that lead to maximal learning (or
asymptotic learning, as a special case) in equilibrium.
5 Learning with Zero Cost
A central question is determining what conditions must be imposed on the capacity structure
of observation for asymptotic/maximal learning. The answer to this is closely connected with
the relation between the precision of private signals and the cost of observation. I begin by
considering the case in which there is zero cost, i.e., observation is free. Even in this case,
it is notable that not every agent will always choose to observe in equilibrium: if private
signals are sufficiently strong, there may not be any realized action sequence in an observed
neighborhood that can alter the agent’s action. In other words, an agent may be indifferent
between observation and no observation.
The following theorem is one of the main results of the paper, and shows that unbounded
private beliefs play a crucial role for learning in a society with no cost of observation. In
particular, asymptotic learning, the strongest form of social learning, can be achieved in every
equilibrium. This result holds even without the symmetry assumption for the signal structure.
Theorem 1. When c = 0 and agents have unbounded private beliefs, asymptotic learning occurs
in every equilibrium.
Theorem 1 presents an interesting comparison with the existing literature. Most of the
above mentioned studies examine conditions on exogenous networks that induce (or do not
induce) asymptotic learning; in contrast, Theorem 1 shows that as long as private beliefs are
unbounded, a network topology that ensures asymptotic learning will automatically form. In
6To be more precise, when private beliefs are strong, P ∗(c) = 1
2
F0(s
∗) + 1
2
(1 − F1(s∗)). With a symmetric
signal structure, it is equal to F0(s
∗).
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other words, with an endogenous network formation, the individual interest in maximizing the
expected payoff and the social interest of inducing the agents’ actions to converge to the true
state are now aligned in the limit. In every equilibrium, agents with private signals that are not
particularly strong will seek to increase the probability that they will take the right action via
observation. Because there is no cost for observation, the range of signals given that an agent
could choose to observe enlarges unboundedly within the signal support as the society grows.
In the limit, each agent almost certainly chooses to observe, and information is thus efficiently
aggregated without any particular assumption on the capacity structure.
The argument above also provides a general intuition behind the proof of this theorem.
Suppose that asymptotic learning did not occur in some equilibrium, then there must be a limit
to the probability of taking the correct action, whose value is less than one. Consider an agent
n whose learning probability is very close to this limit. For her immediate successor n + 1,
observing n’s action will produce a strict improvement: n + 1 is as well-off as n by following
n’s action when n + 1’s signal is not very precise, and strictly better-off than n by following
her own signal when the signal is very precise. Hence the limit on learning probability must be
exceeded, a contradiction.
Acemoglu et al.[1] note that a necessary condition of network topology that leads to asymp-
totic learning is expanding observations, i.e., no agent is excessively influential in terms of being
observed by others. In other words, no agent (or subset of agents) is the sole source of observa-
tional information for infinitely many other agents. This important result leads to the second
implication of Theorem 1 regarding the equilibrium network topology: although it is difficult
to precisely characterize agents’ behavior in each equilibrium, we know that the equilibrium
network must feature expanding observations, i.e., agents will always observe a close predeces-
sor. This is an intuitive result because the action of someone later in the decision sequence
presumably reveals more information. I formally describe this property of equilibrium network
below.
Corollary 1. If c = 0 and agents have unbounded private beliefs, then every equilibrium σ∗
exhibits expanding observations:
lim
n→∞
Qσ∗( max
b∈B(n)
b < M) = 0 for any M ∈ N.
A very simple but illustrative example of the foregoing is that of K(n) = 1 for all n. As
will be illustrated in details in the next section, the optimal observation of each agent (if any)
in equilibrium must be the action of her immediate predecessor. The condition of expanding
observations is satisfied exactly according to this description: because observation has no cost,
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each agent almost certainly chooses to observe in the limit, but no agent excessively influences
other agents because each agent only influences her immediate successor. However, we will
learn in the next section that when cost is positive and private beliefs are strong, an analogous
condition – observing a close predecessor when choosing to observe – would not suffice for the
highest level of information aggregation achievable in equilibrium, i.e., for maximal learning.
In the other direction, when agents have bounded private beliefs, asymptotic learning does
not occur for a number of typical capacity structures and associated equilibria. The following
result lists some scenarios.
Proposition 3. If c = 0 and agents have bounded private beliefs, then asymptotic learning does
not occur in the following scenarios:
(a) K(n) = n− 1.
(b) Some constant K¯ exists such that K(n) ≤ K¯ for all n.
The proposition above highlights two scenarios in which bounded private beliefs block
asymptotic learning. In the first scenario, which corresponds to part (a), it can be shown
that the “social belief” for any agent, i.e., the posterior belief established from observation
alone, is bounded away from 1 in either state of the world, 0 and 1, regardless of the true state.
As a result, asymptotic learning becomes impossible. With a positive probability, herding be-
havior occurs in equilibrium: either starting from some particular agent, all subsequent agents
choose the same (wrong) action (when social belief exceeds private belief at some point); or the
equilibrium features longer and longer periods of uniform behavior, punctuated by increasingly
rare switches (when social belief converges to but never exceeds private belief).
The second scenario, which corresponds to part (b), posits that under either state, there is
a positive probability that all the agents choose incorrectly, which is another form of herding
behavior. When private beliefs are bounded, an agent’s private signal may not be strong enough
to “overturn” the implication from a rather informative observation, and the agent would thus
ignore her private information and simply follow her observation. This affects not only her own
behavior but also the observational learning of her successors because they would also be aware
that her action no longer reveals any information about her own private signal. Therefore,
efficient information aggregation cannot proceed. For instance, it is clear that under either
state of the world, the probability that the first N agents all choose action 1 is bounded away
from zero. When N is large, and when agent N +1 observes a large neighborhood such that an
action sequence of 1’s is more informative than each of her possible private signals, she will then
also choose 1 regardless of her own signal, and so will every agent after her. Herding behavior
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thus ensues as a result.
An atypical scenario that is not captured by the above two is that the limit superior of
K(n) is infinity but K(n) < n − 1. It is still unclear whether asymptotic learning can occur
in equilibrium in this case, because a full answer requires a complete characterization of the
strategic selection of observed neighborhood by every agent. For the purpose of this paper, I
refrain from discussing this topic in depth.
6 Costly Learning with Strong Private Beliefs
6.1 Maximal Learning with Infinite Observations
I have already argued before that when observation is costly and private beliefs are strong,
asymptotic learning is impossible in any equilibrium. Furthermore, as will be shown below,
maximal learning is not guaranteed in equilibrium either. In fact, we can see that whenever
agents have finite observations, maximal learning cannot occur in any equilibrium. For an agent
to choose to make a costly observation given her private signal, it must be the case that some
realized action sequence in her observed neighborhood is so informative that she would rather
turn against her signal and choose the other action. When private beliefs are strong, each agent
chooses actions 0 and 1 with positive probabilities regardless of the true state; therefore, under
either state 0 or 1, the above informative action sequence occurs with a positive probability. As
a result, for any agent who chooses to observe, there is always a positive probability of making
a mistake. For instance, consider again the example of K(n) = 1 for all n. When private beliefs
are strong, the probabilities that any agent would choose 0 when θ = 1 and 1 when θ = 0
are bounded below by F1(−s
∗) and 1−F0(s
∗) correspondingly (with the symmetry assumption
regarding the signal structure, the two probabilities are equal); therefore, the probabilities that
any agent would take the wrong action when θ = 1 and when θ = 0 have the same lower bounds
as well, given that this agent chooses to observe.
The next main result of this paper, Theorem 2, shows that a necessary and sufficient con-
dition for maximal learning with strong private beliefs consists of infinite observations in the
capacity structure.
Theorem 2. When agents have strong private beliefs, maximal learning occurs in every equi-
librium if and only if the capacity structure has infinite observations.
The implication of Theorem 2 is two-fold. On one hand, the necessity of infinite observations
stands in stark contrast to the expanding observations in the previous section, which means
that no agent can be excessively influential but an agent may still be significantly influential
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for infinitely many others. In a world in which the cost of observation is positive and agents
may sometimes rationally choose not to observe, for maximal learning to occur, no agent can
be significantly influential in the sense that any agent’s action can only take up an arbitrarily
small proportion in any other agent’s observation. Indeed, because the probability of any agent
making a mistake is now bounded away from zero, infinite observations must be required to
suppress the probability of the wrong implication from an observed neighborhood.
On the other hand, Theorem 2 guarantees maximal learning when there are infinite ob-
servations. Whenever the size of the observed neighborhood can become arbitrarily large as
the society grows, the probability of taking the right action based on observation converges to
one. The individual choice of not observing, given some extreme signals – and thus a source
for any single agent to make a mistake on her own – actually facilitates social learning by ob-
servation: because any agent may choose not to observe with positive probability, her action
in turn must reveal some information about her private signal. Thus, by adding sufficiently
many observations to a given neighborhood, i.e., by enlarging the neighborhood considerably,
the informativeness of the entire observed action sequence can always be improved. Once a
neighborhood can be arbitrarily large, information can be aggregated efficiently to reveal the
true state.
Following this intuition, I now introduce an outline of the proof of Theorem 2 (detailed proofs
can be found in the Appendix). Several preliminary lemmas are needed. The first lemma below
simply formalizes the argument that when private beliefs are strong, each agent will choose not
to observe with a probability bounded away from zero.
Lemma 1. When agents have strong private beliefs, in every equilibrium σ∗, for all n ∈ N,
sn∗ < s
∗.
Next, I show that infinite observations are a necessary condition for maximal learning, in
contrast to most existing literature stating that observing some close predecessor’s action suffices
for knowing the true state, in an exogenously given network of observation.
Lemma 2. Assume that agents have strong private beliefs. If the capacity structure has finite
observations, then maximal learning does not occur in any equilibrium.
The logic behind the proof of Lemma 2 is rather straightforward. With strong private beliefs,
in either state of the world, each agent takes actions 0 and 1 with probabilities bounded away
from zero. Thus, when agent n observes a neighborhood of at most K size, the probability that
the realized action sequence in this neighborhood would induce agent n to take the wrong action
is also bounded away from zero. If infinitely many agents can only observe a neighborhood whose
size has the same upper bound, maximal learning can never occur.
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The following few lemmas contribute to the proof of the sufficiency of infinite observations
for maximal learning in every equilibrium. Given an equilibrium σ∗, let Bk = {1, · · · , k}, and
consider any agent who observes Bk. Let R
Bk
σ∗ be the random variable of the posterior belief on
the true state being 1, given each decision in Bk. For each realized belief R
Bk
σ∗ = r, we say that
a realized private signal s and decision sequence h in Bk induce r if Pσ∗(θ = 1|h, s) = r.
Lemma 3. For either state θ ∈ {0, 1} and for any s ∈ (s∗, s
∗), limǫ→0+(lim supk→∞Pσ∗(R
Bk
σ∗ >
1− ǫ|0, s)) = limǫ→0+(lim supk→∞Pσ∗(R
Bk
σ∗ < ǫ|1, s)) = 0.
Lemma 3 shows that the action sequence in neighborhood Bk cannot induce a degenerate
belief on the wrong state of the world with positive probability as k becomes large. This result
is necessary because the posterior belief on the wrong state after observing the original neigh-
borhood must be bounded away from 1 if any strict improvement on the learning probability
is to occur by expanding a neighborhood. In the next lemma, I demonstrate the feasibility of
such strict improvement.
Lemma 4. Assume that agents have strong private beliefs. Given any realized belief r ∈ (0, 1)
on state 1 for an agent observing Bk, for any rˆ ∈ (0, r) (rˆ ∈ (r, 1)), N(r, rˆ) ∈ N exists such
that a realized belief that is less than rˆ (higher than rˆ) can be induced by additional N(r, rˆ)
consecutive observations of action 0 (1) in any equilibrium.
Lemma 4 confirms the initial intuition that enlarging a neighborhood can strictly improve the
informativeness of the observed action sequence. This improvement is represented by correcting
a wrong decision by adding a sufficient number of observed actions. Moreover, the number of
observed actions needed, N(r, rˆ), is independent of equilibrium. In the next lemma, I show
that the strict improvement almost surely happens as Bk becomes arbitrarily large, i.e., any
posterior belief that leads to the wrong action will almost surely be reversed toward the true
state after a sufficiently large number of actions are observed.
In the following lemma, given private signal s, let PBkσ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s) denote the probability of
taking the wrong action for an agent observing Bk.
Lemma 5. Assume that agents have strong private beliefs. Given any equilibrium σ∗ and any
private signal s ∈ (s∗, s
∗), let aˆ be the action that a rational agent would take after observing s
and every action in Bk. Then we have limk→∞P
Bk
σ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s) = 0.
Lemma 5 is the most important lemma in the proof. It implies that a sub-optimal strategy
– observing the first k agents in the decision sequence – is already sufficient to reveal the true
state when k approaches infinity. Moreover, the sufficiency of this condition does not require any
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assumption regarding equilibrium strategies of the observed agents, which ensures its validity
in every equilibrium. It then follows naturally that any agent’s equilibrium strategy of choosing
the observed neighborhood should generate a weakly higher posterior probability of taking the
correct action. This argument is central for the proof of Theorem 2.
The key idea in Theorem 2 and its proof is that every observed action adds informativeness
to the entire action sequence. The detailed proof shows that the symmetry assumption regard-
ing the signal structure – which leads to the existence of a symmetric equilibrium – plays an
important role in ensuring this condition. It has a natural interpretation: first, given that an
agent makes a certain observation, because private signals are generated in an unbiased manner
and agents behave similarly (in terms of choosing the observed neighborhood) when receiving
symmetric signals, the Bayes’s update by an observer of his action must be weakly in favor of
the corresponding state as a result of the MLRP. Second, given that an agent chooses not to
observe, the Bayes’ update by the same observer would clearly strictly favor the corresponding
state. These two effects combined show that the observation of every single action contributes
a positive amount to information aggregation.
There are two special cases that ensure positive information contribution of each observed
action, even with an asymmetric signal structure. The first case is when s∗ is sufficiently small
or s∗ is sufficiently large. Intuitively, if an agent chooses not to observe given a relatively
large range of private signals, her action should favor the corresponding state from a Bayesian
observer’s point of view, regardless of her behavior when she chooses to observe. In other words,
the second effect mentioned above already suffices for a definitive Bayesian update, even without
the symmetry assumption. The following result formalizes this argument.
Corollary 2. Given a general (potentially asymmetric) signal structure, if agents have strong
private beliefs and F0(s∗) > F1(s
∗), then maximal learning occurs in every equilibrium if and
only if the capacity structure has infinite observations.
The second case is when there are infinitely many agents with observation capacity K(n) = 1
or K(n) = n − 1. In either of these two extreme cases, an agent’s action reveals a significant
amount of information about the true state, in the sense that the difference between the ex post
belief before and after adding the observation of such an agent is always bounded away from
zero. This property of information contribution only requires MLRP. Hence, once the capacity
structure has infinite observations, observation consisting the actions of arbitrarily many these
agents will result in maximal learning.
Corollary 3. Given a general (potentially asymmetric) signal structure, if ♯{n : K(n) =
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1 or K(n) = n − 1} = ∞, then maximal learning occurs in every equilibrium if and only if
the capacity structure has infinite observations.
6.2 An Example
In this subsection, I introduce an example below to illustrate the difference among asymptotic
learning, maximal learning and (a typical case of) learning in equilibrium with strong private
beliefs and finite observations.
Assume the following signal structure:
F0(s) =
1
2
(s + 1)(
3
2
−
s
2
)
F1(s) =
1
2
(s + 1)(
1
2
+
s
2
).
This signal structure implies the probability density functions
f0(s) =
1− s
2
f1(s) =
1 + s
2
.
Hence, it is easy to see that agents have unbounded (thus strong) private beliefs.
In addition, assume that K(n) = 1 for all n. Consider the case when the cost of observation
is low. When each agent can only observe one of her predecessors, if she chooses to observe
then she would rationally choose to observe the agent with the highest probability of taking
the right action. Agent 2 can only observe agent 1; agent 3, in view of this fact, will choose
to observe agent 2 since agent 2’s action is more informative than agent 1’s action. Proceeding
inductively, in every equilibrium, each agent will only observe their immediate predecessor when
she chooses to observe, which results in a (probabilistic) “line” network. Let sˆ∗ = limn→∞ s
n
∗
and let Pˆ ∗ = limn→∞Pσ∗(an = θ), it follows that the equations characterizing sˆ
∗ and Pˆ ∗ are
Pˆ ∗ = F0(−sˆ
∗) + (F0(sˆ
∗)− F0(−sˆ
∗))Pˆ ∗
Pˆ ∗ −
f1(sˆ
∗)
f0(sˆ∗) + f1(sˆ∗)
= c,
The first condition decomposes the learning probability in the limit, Pˆ ∗, into the probability
that an agent correctly follows his own signal without any observation, and the probability that
she observes and her immediate predecessor’s action is correct. The second condition indicates
the indifference (in the limit) of an agent with signal sˆ∗ between observing and not observing
her immediate predecessor, in the sense that the expected marginal benefit from observation
must be equal to c. They can be further simplified as
1
f0(sˆ∗) + f1(sˆ∗)
f0(sˆ
∗)F0(−sˆ
∗)− f1(sˆ
∗)F1(−sˆ
∗)
F0(−sˆ∗) + F1(−sˆ∗)
= c.
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From the above equation and from the definition of strong private beliefs, we have
sˆ∗ = 1− 4c, if c ≤
1
4
s∗ = 1− 2c, if c ≤
1
2
.
It further implies that
Pσ∗(an = θ) = 1− 4c
2, if c ≤
1
4
P ∗(c) = 1− c2, if c ≤
1
2
.
The first term 1− 4c2 is the equilibrium probability of learning the true state in the limit when
K(n) = 1; the second term 1 − c2 is the probability of learning the true state under maximal
learning. Figure 4 illustrates the learning probability in the limit under asymptotic learning,
under maximal learning and in equilibrium, as a function of the cost of observation c.
Figure 4: Learning Probability as a Function of c
6.3 Welfare Analysis
In this subsection, I analyze the impact of observation cost and signal precision on the limit
learning probability in equilibrium, limn→∞Pσ∗(an = θ). This probability represents the ul-
timate level of social learning achieved in a growing society. Two sets of parameters are of
particular interest in this comparative statics: the cost of observation, c, and the precision
of the private signal structure relative to cost. In many practical scenarios, these parameters
capture the essential characteristics of a community with respect to how difficult it is to obtain
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information from others and how confident an agent can be about her private knowledge. The
aim of this analysis is to identify the type(s) of environment that facilitate social learning.
In the following analysis, I show that compared to an environment with free observation,
having a positive cost may actually improve the level of social learning. In previous sections,
Theorem 1 shows that zero cost and unbounded private beliefs imply the highest learning
probability, i.e., asymptotic learning; Theorem 2 allows us to obtain a straightforward formula
for computing the limit learning probability with strong private beliefs and infinite observations:
lim
n→∞
Pσ∗(an = θ) = F0(s
∗)− F0(−s
∗) + F0(−s
∗) = F0(s
∗).
Note that F0(s
∗) − F0(−s
∗) is the probability (in the limit) that an agent chooses to observe;
Theorem 2 indicates that observation reveals the true state of the world with near certainty
when the society gets large. F0(−s
∗) is the probability (in the limit) that an agent chooses not
to observe and undertakes the correct action. My first result concerns an in-between case, i.e.,
under bounded private beliefs and infinite observations, the comparison between an environment
with zero cost and one with positive cost. For any single agent, other things equal, it is always
beneficial to observe with no cost than with positive cost. However, positive cost may actually be
desirable for the society as a whole: for any agent, even though relying on her signal more often
is harmful to her own learning, it provides more information for her successors who observe her
action, hence raising the informativeness of observation. This argument provides the intuition
for the formal result below.
Consider the capacity structure K(n) = n − 1, i.e., any agent is able to observe all her
predecessors. Let σ∗(c) be an equilibrium under cost c, and let P ∗(σ∗(c)) be the limit probability
of learning, given σ∗(c), i.e., P ∗(σ∗(c)) = limn→∞Pσ∗(c)(an = θ).
Proposition 4. Assume that agents have bounded private beliefs. Let σ∗(0) be any equilibrium
under zero cost. There are positive values c¯, c (c¯ > c), such that for any c ∈ (c, c¯) and any
σ∗(c), P ∗(σ∗(0)) < P ∗(σ∗(c)).
With zero cost and bounded private beliefs, herding occurs because at some point in the
decision sequence, an agent may abandon all her private information, although her observation
is not perfectly informative of the true state. Yielding to observation, in turn, causes her own
actions to reveal no information about her private signal, and thus information aggregation ends.
However, with positive cost and strong private beliefs – and although nothing has changed in
the signal structure – now every agent relies on some of her possible private signals, which
strengthens the informativeness of observation. When the probability of an agent choosing to
observe is sufficiently high (but still bounded away from one), an agent may enjoy a higher
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chance of taking the right action than when observation is free for everyone. The comparison
is illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Limit Learning Probability and Cost of Observation
Next, I consider the effect of signal strength that is measured by the probability of receiving
relatively more informative private signals. In most existing literature, the network of obser-
vation is exogenously given. In other words, observation is “free” and non-strategic, which is
not affected by how accurate an agent’s private signal is. However, when observation becomes
strategic and costly, there is a trade-off between obtaining a higher probability of taking the
right action and saving the cost. As a result, when an agent receives a rather strong signal,
she might as well cede the opportunity of observational learning and just act according to her
private information. Therefore, in this environment, strong signals can be detrimental to social
learning. The next result demonstrates this phenomenon.
With strong private beliefs, denote the strength of the private signal relative to cost as
F0(−s
∗) + 1 − F0(s
∗), i.e., the probability of not observing even if observing reveals the true
state.
Proposition 5. Generically, there exist scenarios where a signal structure with higher strength
leads to lower limit learning probability.
In summary, we only see clear monotonicity (lower cost or stronger signals are better for
social learning) in extreme scenarios (unbounded private beliefs or zero cost). When private
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beliefs are bounded and cost is positive, two new factors enter the determinant of the limit
learning probability. First, the fact that costly observation alone may now provide higher
informativeness than free observation implies that positive cost may actually be more favorable
for social learning. Second, positive cost signifies a trade-off between two components of an
agent’s final payoff – the probability of undertaking the right action and the cost of observation
– thus, from the perspective of social learning, weaker private signals may be preferred because
they incentivize agents to achieve better learning by observation. As a result of these joint
effects, the learning process via endogenous networks of observation becomes more complex.
6.4 Flexible Observations with Non-Negative Marginal Cost
Thus far, I have assumed a single and fixed cost for observing any neighborhood of size up to
the capacity constraint. Another interesting setting is to assume that the cost of observation
depends on the number of actions observed. It can be easily anticipated that a full charac-
terization of the pattern of social learning is difficult, given an arbitrary cost function; such
characterization requires detailed calculations regarding the marginal benefit of any additional
observed action, which varies substantially based on the specific signal distributions. However,
in the following typical class of cost functions, the previous results can easily be applied to
describe the level of social learning when the cost of observation changes with the number of
observed actions.
Consider the following setting: after receiving her private signal, each agent can decide how
many actions (up to K(n)) to observe. As in the original model, the actions are observed
simultaneously7. The cost function of observing m actions is denoted with c(m). Assume that
c(0) = 0 and that c(m) satisfies the property of non-negative marginal cost: c(m+1)−c(m) ≥ 0
for all m ∈ N. Here, maximal learning is defined as to achieve efficient information aggregation
in the limit by paying the least cost possible: limn→∞ Pσ∗(an = θ) = P
∗(c(1)). The following
result is essentially a corollary of Theorems 1 and 2 and characterizes the pattern of social
learning under this class of cost functions.
Proposition 6. Assume that agents have unbounded private beliefs. Under the above class of
cost functions, the following propositions are true for the social learning process:
(a) Asymptotic learning occurs in every equilibrium if and only if c(1) = 0.
(b) When c(1) > 0, maximal learning occurs in every equilibrium if c(m+1)− c(m) = 0 for all
m ≥ 1; otherwise, maximal learning does not occur in any equilibrium.
7Nevertheless, the results below still hold in the context of sequential observation, i.e., an agent can choose
whether to observe an additional action by paying the marginal cost, based on what she has already observed.
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Proposition 6 indicates that the difference in the level of social learning produced by the
different costs of observation becomes even larger in the context of a more general cost function.
First, the results show that the key factor determining whether asymptotic learning occurs in
equilibrium is c(1), i.e., the cost of observing the first action. When c(1) = 0, any agent can
at least do as well as any of her predecessors by simply observing the latter and following the
observed action; thus, when private beliefs are unbounded, learning does not stop until agents
almost certainly undertake the correct action. Secondly, when c(1) > 0, maximal learning
occurs if and only if each additional observation is free. We already know that maximal learning
requires agents to choose to observe arbitrarily large neighborhoods when the society is large;
with non-negative marginal cost, the cost of observing such a neighborhood gets strictly higher
than c(1) as long as the marginal cost of observing some other action is positive. As a result,
even if the capacity structure has infinite observations, an agent will choose not to observe when
she receives a signal that makes her more or less indifferent between not observing and paying
c(1) to know the true state. Therefore, maximal learning never occurs.
7 Discussion
7.1 Observation Preceding Signal
In the previous analysis, we see that under strong private beliefs, (1) asymptotic learning is
impossible and (2) if the capacity structure has only finite observations and observation is
costly, then maximal learning does not occur in any equilibrium even when private beliefs are
unbounded. As it turns out, an agent’s timing of choosing her observation plays an important
role: because an agent receives her private signal before choosing observations, it always re-
mains possible that an agent chooses not to observe and bases her action solely on her private
signal, which may be rather strong but is nonetheless not perfectly informative. Thus, when
observations are finite, there is always a probability bounded away from zero that observations
will induce incorrect action.
However, in practical situations, the timing of the arrival of different types of information
is often not fixed. For instance, when a firm decides whether to adopt a new production
technology, it may well take less time to conduct a survey about which nearby firms have
already implemented the technology than to obtain private knowledge about the technology
itself via research and trials. It is then interesting to study the different patterns that the social
learning process would exhibit under this alternative timing. The next result demonstrates that
when observation precedes private signal, learning somehow becomes easier as long as the cost
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of observation is not too high: asymptotic learning can occur even when cost is positive and
observations are finite. Such difference between timing schemes only arises when observation is
endogenous and costly – when observation is exogenous or free, the two timing schemes would
essentially lead to identiical equilibria.
Consider the alternative dynamic process in which each agent chooses her observed neigh-
borhood before receiving her private signal. Let Y (m) denote the probability that an agent will
take the right action if she can observe a total of m other agents, each of whose actions are
based solely on her own private signal. The result can be easily generalized to the case with an
asymmetric signal structure.
Proposition 7. When agents have unbounded private beliefs, asymptotic learning occurs in
every equilibrium if and only if there exists n such that Y (K(n))− F0(0) ≥ c.
Proposition 7 shows that a necessary and sufficient condition for asymptotic learning is the
existence of an agent who initiates the information aggregation process by beginning to observe.
Because observation precedes the private signal, each of her successors can be at least as well
off as she is simply by observing her action. Therefore, after this starting point, observation
becomes the optimal choice even for agents with lower capacity. Furthermore, because there is no
conflict between a strong signal and costly observation (observation occurs first anyway), there
is no blockade of information once observation begins. As in the case with unbounded private
beliefs and zero cost, a network topology featuring expanding observations will spontaneously
form and asymptotic learning will occur as a result.
For better illustration, consider an environment with unbounded private beliefs and infinite
observations in which the limit learning probability can be fully characterized both when a
signal precedes observation and when observation precedes a signal. Figure 6 shows the relation
between the limit learning probability and the cost of observation under the two timing schemes;
this figure also shows that asymptotic learning occurs within a much larger range of cost when
observation comes first, while the limit learning probability falls abruptly to that with no
observation when cost becomes high because of the lack of an agent to trigger observational
learning. When agents receive private signals first, the limit learning probability is continuous
against the cost of observation, and the threshold of cost above which observation stops is higher;
as a result, agents learn less when cost is relatively low and more when cost is intermediate
compared with the other timing scheme.
When private beliefs are bounded, a partial characterization analogous to Proposition 3 can
be obtained under this alternative timing: asymptotic learning fails for a number of typical
capacity structures and associated equilibria. In each scenario, as with the analysis above, once
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Figure 6: Limit Learning Probability under Two Timing Schemes
observation is initiated by some agent, all the successors will choose to observe. Of course, the
cost of observation must be bounded by a certain positive value (which can be characterized
based on the specified equilibrium behavior) to ensure the existence of the particular equilibrium;
otherwise, observation never begins and each agent would simply act in isolation according only
to her private signal.
7.2 Information Diffusion
Another important assumption in the renowned herding behavior and information cascades lit-
erature is that observing an agent’s action does not reveal any additional information regarding
the agent’s knowledge about the actions of others, which occurs without much loss of generality
in earlier models because agents are assumed to observe the entire past action history in any
event. In a more general setting, it can be expected that allowing an agent to access the knowl-
edge (still about actions and not about private signals) of agents in their observed neighborhood
makes a significant difference because information can now flow not only through direct links in
the network but also through indirect paths. In this section, I discuss the impact of such added
informational richness on the level of social learning.
Assume the following information diffusion in the observation structure: if agent n has
observed the actions in neighborhood B(n) before choosing her own action, then any agent
observing n knows an and each action in B(n). In our model of endogenous network formation,
this alternative assumption has a particular implication: if agent n sees that another agent m
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chose action 1 but m did not know the action of anyone else, n can immediately infer that
m must have received a rather strong signal. As a result, when the observed neighborhood
becomes large, the observing agent can apply the weak law of large numbers to draw inferences
regarding the true state of the world. With this simpler argument, the symmetry assumption
regarding the signal structure can be relaxed to obtain the following result.
Proposition 8. With information diffusion, when agents have strong private beliefs, maximal
learning occurs in every equilibrium if and only if the capacity structure has infinite observations.
Somewhat curiously, introducing information diffusion into the model only leads to relaxing
the symmetry assumption but still results in the same necessary and sufficient condition for
maximal learning. The underlying reason for this result is that as long as each agent chooses
only to observe with a probability bounded away from 1 (i.e., for a range of signals that differs
significantly from full support), every agent will only know the finite actions of others with near
certainty if observations are finite. Thus, when the capacity structure has finite observations,
the additional information acquired via information diffusion will not be sufficient for maximal
learning.
We have seen from the above result that even with information diffusion, a capacity structure
with finite observations never leads to maximal learning in any equilibrium. An even more
surprising observation is that, when the capacity structure has finite observations, information
diffusion may not be helpful at all in terms of the limit learning probability. For instance,
consider the capacity structure K(n) = 1 for all n and symmetric private signals, and consider
agent n where n is large. In equilibrium, if any agent chooses to observe, she will observe her
immediate predecessor. By choosing to observe some agent m1, agent n will know the actions
of an almost certainly finite “chain” of agents m1,m2, · · · ,ml, such that m1 observed m2, · · · ,
ml−1 observed ml, and ml chose not to observe. It is first clear that aml−1 must almost surely
equal aml because the range of signals – given that ml−1 chooses to observe – is close to that for
ml (by the assumption that n is large), which induces ml−1 to follow ml’s action that implies a
stronger private signal. Hence, ml−1’s action does not reveal any additional information about
the true state. Repeating this argument inductively, the only action that is informative to agent
n is aml . If agent n can only observe a single action, she can use the identical argument to
deduce that the observation ultimately reflects the action of an agent who chose not to observe.
Therefore, the limit learning probability limn→∞Pσ∗(an = θ) is not affected by information
diffusion.
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7.3 Costly Learning with Weak Private Beliefs
When private beliefs are weak, asymptotic/maximal learning may not be achieved in the pre-
vious model because of the possibility of herding. More specifically, as n becomes large, some
agents’ actions may be so accurate (although not perfect) that successors choose to observe and
follow them regardless of their own private signal. Hence, more observations do not necessarily
provide more information about the true state when the observation structure is determinant,
i.e., any agent n can choose their neighborhood among {1, · · · , n − 1}. A partial character-
ization similar to Proposition 3 can be obtained that shows that maximal learning (which is
equivalent to asymptotic learning when private beliefs are weak) cannot occur for a number of
typical capacity structures and the associated equilibria. However, maximal learning can still
be approximated with certain general stochastic observation structures. First, I introduce the
notion of ǫ-maximal learning, which is the approximation of the original notion of maximal
learning.
Definition 5. Given a signal structure (F0, F1), we say that ǫ-maximal learning occurs in
equilibrium σ∗ when the limit inferior of the probability of an being the correct action is at least
(1− ǫ)P ∗(c): lim infn→∞ Pσ∗(an = θ) ≥ (1− ǫ)P
∗(c).
ǫ-maximal learning describes the situation in which an agent undertakes the correct action
with a probability of at least (1− ǫ)P ∗(c). Note that P ∗(c) = 1 when private beliefs are weak.
Hence, ǫ-maximal learning under weak private beliefs implies that the learning probability
Pσ∗(an = θ) is bounded below by 1 − ǫ in the limit. In fact, when ǫ is close to zero, social
learning will be almost asymptotic. I will provide sufficient conditions below at an equilibrium
for ǫ-maximal learning to occur. The essential factor that facilitates ǫ-maximal learning is the
existence of a non-persuasive neighborhood, which is introduced by Acemoglu et al.[1]. I define
this concept below.
Definition 6. When agents have weak private beliefs, let
β¯ = lim
s→+1
f1(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
β = lim
s→−1
f0(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
denote the upper and lower bounds of an agent’s private beliefs on the true state being 1. A
finite subset of agents B is a non-persuasive neighborhood in equilibrium σ∗ if
Pσ∗(θ = 1|ak = yk for all k ∈ B) ∈ (β, β¯)
for any set of values yk ∈ {0, 1} for each k.
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A neighborhood B is non-persuasive with respect to equilibrium σ∗ if given any possible
realized action sequence in this neighborhood, an agent that observes it may still rely on his
own private signal. If a neighborhood is non-persuasive, then any agent will choose not to
observe it and follow his own private signal with positive probability. In other words, regardless
of the realized action sequence, there exist a positive measure of private signals such that
the agent takes action 0 and another positive measure of private signals such that the agent
takes action 1. Note that the definition of a non-persuasive neighborhood depends on the
particular equilibrium σ∗; however, there is a class of neighborhoods that are non-persuasive
in any equilibrium. Suppose that K(n) = 0 for n = 1, 2, · · · ,M for some M ∈ N+; in other
words, the first M agents cannot observe any of the actions of others. In this case, there is
a positive M ′ ≤ M such that any subset of {1, · · · ,M ′} is a non-persuasive neighborhood in
any equilibrium. To illustrate this, simply note that {1} already satisfies the criterion: for any
agent who can only observe agent 1’s action, there must be a range of strong private signals
that are more informative about the true state than the action of agent 1.
Consider the following stochastic observation structure for equilibrium σ∗: there areM non-
persuasive neighborhoods C1, · · · , CM such that for all n, agent n can only observe within some
Ci, i ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, with probability ǫn > 0; with probability 1− ǫn, agent n can observe within
{1, · · · , n− 1}. In both cases, the capacity structure {K(n)}∞n=1 stays the same. Proposition 9
below provides a class of stochastic observation structures in which ǫ-maximal learning occurs
for any signal structure. Establishing this result depends on how to interpret an observed
action from a Bayesian observer’s perspective. Given the positive probability with which an
agent can only choose to observe a non-persuasive neighborhood, her final action now may
reflect either conformity with her observation or her strong private signal. This property holds
even when private beliefs are weak. Hence, we can follow a similar argument to that in the
proof of Theorem 2 that shows that the total informativeness of the action sequence in any
neighborhood can always be increased by including in it enough additional actions.
Proposition 9. In any equilibrium σ∗ with the above stochastic capacity structure, ǫ-maximal
learning occurs if limn→∞ ǫn = ǫ and limn→∞K(n) =∞.
The implication of Proposition 9 is rather surprising. In contrast to many existing results
in the literature that lead to herding behavior more easily when agents receive weaker signals,
this theorem indicates that learning dynamics can be much richer and social learning can be
rather accurate in a general network of observation in which links are formed endogenously.
In particular, the limit learning probability can even be higher under weak private beliefs than
under strong private beliefs. For example, in an environment with infinite observations, consider
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an equilibrium in which beginning with some agent n, each agent chooses to observe regardless
of her private signal when she can observe within the whole set of her predecessors (such an
equilibrium can exist only under weak private beliefs). Proposition 9 shows that the learning
probability Pσ∗(an = θ) is bounded below by 1− ǫ in the limit because the probability that an
agent chooses to observe has the same lower bound in the limit. When ǫ is arbitrarily small,
the agents can almost asymptotically learn the true state of the world, which they cannot do
under strong private beliefs and which also relates to the result that weaker private signals may
actually imply a higher limit learning probability in the welfare analysis of the previous section.
Comparing Proposition 9 with existing results in the literature on achieving asymptotic
learning under bounded private beliefs in an exogenously given and stochastic observation struc-
ture (e.g., Theorem 4 in Acemoglu et al.[1]) is also illuminating. The main implication from
existing results is that, if agents observe the entire history of actions with some probability
(which is uniformly bounded away from zero) and observe some non-persuasive neighborhood
with some probability (which converges to zero but when the infinite sum of such probabilities
over agents is unbounded) in a stochastic observation structure satisfying expanding observa-
tions, then observing some close predecessor reveals the true state in the limit. In Proposition
9, the role of observing a non-persuasive neighborhood with positive probability is similar – to
make agents rely on their own signals with positive probability such that their actions become
informative – but to know the true state in the limit, the key factor continues to be to observe
an arbitrarily large neighborhood. Thus, to approximate maximal learning with endogenous
observation, even when limn→∞K(n) = ∞, it is not sufficient for the probability of making
observations within {1, · · · , n − 1} to be bounded away from zero; instead, such probability
must be close to one.
As a useful sidenote, the results in this paper also apply in the generalized context in which
agents are divided into groups g1, g2, · · · . In period i ∈ N, agents in group gi make their choices
simultaneously with capacity K(i). In other words, the largest neighborhood that an agent in gi
can observe is ∪i−1j=1gj . This generalization allows for the possibility that multiple agents move
(choose their observed neighborhood and then their action) simultaneously during each period.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, I have studied the problem of sequential learning in a network of observation.
A large and growing literature has studied the problem of social learning in exogenously given
networks. Seminal papers, such as Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch[8], Banerjee[6] and
Smith and Sorensen[28], first studied environments in which each agent can observe the entire
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past history of actions. Recent contributions, such as Acemoglu et al.[1], generalized the network
topology to being stochastic. The central question is whether equilibria lead to asymptotic
learning, i.e., efficient aggregation of information, and the results in the literature point to
two crucial factors: unbounded private beliefs, and expanding observations (i.e. no agent is
excessively influential). When these two criteria are satisfied, asymptotic learning occurs in
every equilibrium.
In many relevant situations, individuals do not automatically acquire information from a
given network of observation but are instead engaged in strategic and costly observations of
others’ actions. Such behavior can be understood as forming links with others, which constitutes
the ultimate network of observation. This raises the question of how information is aggregated in
an endogenously formed network and what level of social learning can be achieved in equilibrium
in different scenarios. To address these questions, I have formulated a model of sequential
learning in a network of observation constructed by agents’ strategic and costly choices of
observed neighborhoods.
In the model, agents sequentially make strategic moves. Each agent receives an informative
private signal, after which she can pay a cost to observe a neighborhood among her predecessors.
The size of the observed neighborhood is limited by a given capacity constraint. Given her signal
and the realized action sequence in her chosen neighborhood, each agent then chooses one of
two possible actions. I have characterized pure-strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria for arbitrary
capacity structures and have also characterized the conditions under which different types of
social learning occur. In particular, I focused on asymptotic learning and maximal learning.
Asymptotic learning refers to efficient information aggregation, i.e. agents’ actions converging
in probability to the right action as the society becomes large. Maximal learning refers to the
same convergence that is conditional on observation. Maximal learning reduces to asymptotic
learning when agents almost certainly choose to observe.
Two concepts are shown to be crucial in determining the level of social learning in equi-
librium. The first is the precision of private signals. Apart from whether private beliefs are
bounded, the relation between private beliefs and the cost of observation is equally important.
When the cost is positive, I say that private beliefs are strong if for some signals an agent would
not be willing to pay the cost even to know the true state, and that otherwise private beliefs
are weak. The second important concept is that of infinite or finite observations with respect
to the capacity structure.
My first main result, Theorem 1, shows that when private beliefs are unbounded and the cost
of observation is zero, asymptotic learning occurs in every equilibrium. It further implies that
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the network topology in every equilibrium will automatically feature expanding observations.
It provides a micro-foundation for the above mentioned condition of expanding observation,
i.e. agents tend to observe some close predecessor when observation is not costly. In this case,
information is always efficiently aggregated unconditionally.
The next main theorem, Theorem 2, characterizes the necessary and sufficient condition for
maximal learning when agents have strong (not necessarily unbounded) private beliefs: if and
only if the capacity structure has infinite observations, agents will learn the true state with near
certainty via observation when the society becomes large. This result stands in stark contrast
to the literature in the sense that each agent must be infinitesimally influential to others in any
observed neighborhood to ensure maximal learning. As long as there are “influential” agents,
even though they may not be excessively influential, there is always a positive probability
of taking the wrong action after observation. Conversely, whenever observations are infinite,
information can be aggregated efficiently to guarantee the revelation of the true state conditional
on observation.
I believe that the framework developed in this paper has the potential to facilitate a more
general analysis of sequential learning dynamics in an endogenously formed network of obser-
vation. The following questions are among those that can be studied in future work using this
framework: (1) equilibrium learning when agents’ preferences are heterogeneous; (2) equilibrium
learning when the cost of observation is random and is part of an agent’s private information;
(3) the relation between the cost of observation and the speed (rate of convergence) of sequential
learning.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2. 1: Consider any sn ≥ 0. Let H
1
n(sn) (H
0
n(sn)) denote the set of
observed actions in equilibrium that will induce agent n to choose action 1 (0) when her private
signal is sn. We know that
Pσ∗(an = θ|sn)
=
f0(sn)Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (sn)) ∈ H
0
n(sn)|θ = 0) + f1(sn)Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (sn)) ∈ H
1
n(sn)|θ = 1)
f0(sn) + f1(sn)
=
f0(sn)
f0(sn) + f1(sn)
Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (sn)) ∈ H
0
n(sn)|θ = 0)
+ (1−
f0(sn)
f0(sn) + f1(sn)
)Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (sn)) ∈ H
1
n(sn)|θ = 1).
Hence, the marginal benefit of observation is
Pσ∗(an = θ|sn)−
f1(sn)
f0(sn) + f1(sn)
=
f0(sn)
f0(sn) + f1(sn)
Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (sn)) ∈ H
0
n(sn)|θ = 0)
−
f1(sn)
f0(sn) + f1(sn)
Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (sn)) ∈ H
0
n(sn)|θ = 1).
Now, consider any s1n > s
2
n ≥ 0, and the following sub-optimal strategy σ
′
n(s
2
n) for agent
n when her private signal is s2n: observe the same neighborhood and given any observation,
choose the same action as if her signal were s1n. The marginal benefit of observation under this
strategy is
f0(s
2
n)
f0(s2n) + f1(s
2
n)
Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (s
1
n)) ∈ H
0
n(s
1
n)|θ = 0)
−
f1(s
2
n)
f0(s2n) + f1(s
2
n)
Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (s
1
n)) ∈ H
0
n(s
1
n)|θ = 1).
Because σ∗1n (s
1
n) 6= ∅ by assumption, we know that
f0(s
1
n)
f0(s1n) + f1(s
1
n)
Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (s
1
n)) ∈ H
0
n(s
1
n)|θ = 0)
−
f1(s
1
n)
f0(s1n) + f1(s
1
n)
Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (s
1
n)) ∈ H
0
n(s
1
n)|θ = 1) ≥ c.
By the MLRP, f1(s
2
n)
f0(s2n)+f1(s
2
n)
<
f1(s1n)
f0(s1n)+f1(s
1
n)
and f0(s
2
n)
f0(s2n)+f1(s
2
n)
>
f0(s1n)
f0(s1n)+f1(s
1
n)
. Therefore, we
have
f0(s
2
n)
f0(s2n) + f1(s
2
n)
Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (s
1
n)) ∈ H
0
n(s
1
n)|θ = 0)
−
f1(s
2
n)
f0(s2n) + f1(s
2
n)
Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (s
1
n)) ∈ H
0
n(s
1
n)|θ = 1) > c,
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which implies that σ∗1n (s
2
n) 6= ∅.
2: Consider any s1n > s
2
n ≥ 0, and the following sub-optimal strategy σ
′
n(s
1
n) for agent n
when her private signal is s1n: observe the same neighborhood and, given any observation, choose
the same action as if her signal were s2n. We have
Pσ∗(an = θ|s
1
n) ≥ Pσ∗−n,σ′n(s1n)(an = θ|s
1
n)
=
f0(s
1
n)Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (s
2
n)) ∈ H
0
n(s
2
n)|θ = 0) + f1(s
1
n)Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (s
2
n)) ∈ H
1
n(s
2
n)|θ = 1)
f0(s1n) + f1(s
1
n)
=
f0(s
1
n)
f0(s1n) + f1(s
1
n)
Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (s
2
n)) ∈ H
0
n(s
2
n)|θ = 0)
+ (1−
f0(s
1
n)
f0(s1n) + f1(s
1
n)
)Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (s
2
n)) ∈ H
1
n(s
2
n)|θ = 1).
Therefore, we know that
Pσ∗(an = θ|s
1
n)− Pσ∗(an = θ|s
2
n)
≥Pσ∗−n,σ′1n (s1n)(an = θ|s
1
n)−Pσ∗(an = θ|s
2
n)
=(
f0(s
2
n)
f0(s2n) + f1(s
2
n)
−
f0(s
1
n)
f0(s1n) + f1(s
1
n)
)
(Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (s
2
n)) ∈ H
1
n(s
2
n)|θ = 1)− Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (s
2
n)) ∈ H
0
n(s
2
n)|θ = 0)).
Consider any h ∈ H0n(s
2
n), and consider h
′ from the same neighborhood such that every action
0 (1) in h is replaced by 1 (0) in h′. We know from the definition of H0n(s
2
n) that f0(s
2
n)Pσ∗(h|θ =
0) > f1(s
2
n)Pσ∗(h|θ = 1); by the assumption that s
2
n ≥ 0, we have Pσ∗(h|θ = 0) > Pσ∗(h|θ = 1).
By symmetry, it follows that Pσ∗(h
′|θ = 1) = Pσ∗(h|θ = 0) > Pσ∗(h|θ = 1) = Pσ∗(h
′|θ = 0).
Hence, we have f1(s
2
n)Pσ∗(h
′|θ = 1) > f0(s
2
n)Pσ∗(h
′|θ = 0), i.e., h′ ∈ H1n(s
2
n). It then follows
that Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (s
2
n)) ∈ H
1
n(s
2
n)|θ = 1) ≥ Pσ∗(hn(σ
∗1
n (s
2
n)) ∈ H
0
n(s
2
n)|θ = 0), which immediately
implies that Pσ∗(an = θ|s
1
n) ≥ Pσ∗(an = θ|s
2
n).
3: This result follows directly from 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. First, note that when c = 0, it is always feasible for an agent to observe
and imitate her immediate predecessor, which guarantees her the same expected payoff as this
immediate predecessor. Hence, we know that Pσ∗(an = θ) is weakly increasing in n. Since this
probability is upper bounded by 1, the sequence {Pσ∗(an = θ)} converges. Let r denote the
limit.
Suppose that r < 1. Thus, for any ǫ > 0, N exists such that for any n > N , Pσ∗(an = θ) ∈
(r− ǫ, r]. Take one such n, and consider agent n+1 and her sub-optimal strategy of observing
agent n. By the assumption of unbounded private belief, s¯n+1 and sn+1 exists such that agent
n + 1 is indifferent between following her own signal and following agent n’s action, i.e., the
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following two conditions are satisfied:
f1(s¯n+1)
f0(s¯n+1) + f1(s¯n+1)
=
f1(s¯n+1)
f0(s¯n+1) + f1(s¯n+1)
Pσ∗(an = 1|θ = 1)
+
f0(s¯n+1)
f0(s¯n+1) + f1(s¯n+1)
Pσ∗(an = 0|θ = 0)
f0(sn+1)
f0(sn+1) + f1(sn+1)
=
f1(sn+1)
f0(sn+1) + f1(sn+1)
Pσ∗(an = 1|θ = 1)
+
f0(sn+1)
f0(sn+1) + f1(sn+1)
Pσ∗(an = 0|θ = 0).
The above equation can be further simplified as
f1(s¯n+1)
f0(s¯n+1)
=
Pσ∗(an = 0|θ = 0)
Pσ∗(an = 0|θ = 1)
f0(sn+1)
f1(sn+1)
=
Pσ∗(an = 1|θ = 1)
Pσ∗(an = 1|θ = 0)
.
By the previous argument, Pσ∗(an = θ) =
1
2Pσ∗(an = 1|θ = 1) +
1
2Pσ∗(an = 0|θ = 0) ≤ r, and
hence min{Pσ∗(an = 1|θ = 1),Pσ∗ (an = 0|θ = 0)} ≤ r. Without loss of generality, assume that
Pσ∗(an = 1|θ = 1) ≤ r. Then, Pσ∗(an = 0|θ = 1) ≥ 1 − r, and hence
f1(s¯n+1)
f0(s¯n+1)
≤ 11−r . Let sˆ be
the value of the private signal such that f1(sˆ)
f0(sˆ)
= 21−r . We know that
Pσ∗(an+1 = θ)− Pσ∗(an = θ) ≥
∫ 1
sˆ
1
2
(f1(s)Pσ∗(an = 0|θ = 1)− f0(s)Pσ∗(an = 0|θ = 0))ds
≥
∫ 1
sˆ
1
2
((1 − r)f1(s)− f0(s))ds
≥
∫ 1
sˆ
1
2
f0(s)ds.
Therefore, we have
∫ 1
sˆ
1
2
f0(s)ds ≤ Pσ∗(an+1 = θ)− Pσ∗(an = θ) < ǫ.
For sufficiently small ǫ, this inequality is violated, and thus we have a contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 1. By Theorem 1 in Acemoglu et al. (2011), any network topology that
does not have expanding observations cannot support asymptotic learning. Because asymptotic
learning occurs in every equilibrium when c = 0 and agents have unbounded private beliefs, it
must follow that Qσ∗ has expanding observation for any σ
∗.
Proof of Proposition 3. Part (a) is already proved by Smith and Sorensen[28] in their The-
orem 1. Acemoglu et al.[1] offer an alternative proof in their Theorem 3. First, note that when
the cost of observation is zero and K(n) = n − 1 for all n, for every agent with any private
signal in any equilibrium, observing her optimal choice of neighborhood generates the same
equilibrium behavior as in the equilibrium in which each agent observes all her predecessors’
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actions regardless of her private signal because any action that the agent chooses not to observe
must have no influence on her own action. Second, in the equilibrium where each agent observes
all her predecessors’ actions regardless of her private signal, the agents’ behavior coincides with
that in a model where this observation structure (each agent observing the entire action history
before her) is exogenously given. Hence, the proofs above apply directly.
For Part (b), assume that c = 0 and private beliefs are bounded, and suppose that there is
an equilibrium in which asymptotic learning occurs. I first show that for all M ∈ N, N ∈ N
exists such that maxb∈σ∗1n (sn) b > M for every sn and every n > N .
To prove the above claim, first note that by assumption, N ′ ∈ N exists such that K(n) > 0
for all n > N ′. It immediately follows from c = 0 that Pσ∗(an = θ) is weakly increasing in n
for all n > N ′. Next, for any M ∈ N, let aˆ(s) denote the action that maximizes the expected
payoff for an agent whose private signal is s and who observes the neighborhood {1, · · · ,M}.
It is clear that sups∈(−1,1) Pσ∗1 ,··· ,σ∗M (aˆ(s) = θ) < 1 because private beliefs are bounded and
M is finite. Because asymptotic learning occurs by assumption, N ′′ ∈ N exists such that
Pσ∗(an = θ) > sups∈(−1,1) Pσ∗1 ,··· ,σ∗M (aˆ(s) = θ) for all n > N
′′. Let N = max{N ′, N ′′} + 1.
For any agent n > N , by observing agent N and copying agent N ’s action, she can achieve a
strictly higher probability of taking the right action than by observing {1, · · · ,M}. Hence, it
must be the case that maxb∈σ∗1n (sn) b > M for every sn and every n > N . Then, the argument
in the proof of Theorem 3 of Acemoglu et al.[1], whose validity requires only the existence of
capacity upper bound K¯, can be applied to show that asymptotic learning does not occur in
any equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 1. The definition of s∗ implies that when agent n has a private signal of s∗,
he is indifferent between paying c to know the true state and choosing accordingly, and paying
nothing and choosing 1. Note that the largest possible benefit from observing is always strictly
less than knowing the true state with certainty. Hence, the (positive) private signal that makes
agent n indifferent between observing and not observing must be less than s∗.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that when the capacity structure has finite observations, maxi-
mal learning occurs in some equilibrium σ∗. It follows that K ∈ N exists such that, for any ǫ > 0
and N ∈ N, n > N exists such that Pσ∗(an = θ|sn ∈ (−s
n
∗ , s
n
∗ )) > 1− ǫ and 0 < K(n) ≤ K.
Consider one such agent n. For at least one state θ ∈ (0, 1), there must be some sn ∈
(−sn∗ , s
n
∗ ) such that Pσ∗(an = θ|θ, sn) > 1 − ǫ. Without loss of generality, assume that (one)
such θ is 1. Since sn ∈ (−s
n
∗ , s
n
∗ ), there must be some realized action sequence in n’s observed
neighborhood σ∗1n (sn), given which n will take action 0. Because, by Lemma 1, K(n) ≤ K, we
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know that when the true state is 1, the probability of this action sequence occurring is bounded
below by min{F1(s∗), 1 − F1(s
∗)}K . Hence, we have
1− ǫ < Pσ∗(an = 1|1, sn) ≤ 1−min{F1(s∗), 1− F1(s
∗)}K
However, for sufficiently small ǫ we have 1 − ǫ > 1 − min{F1(s∗), 1 − F1(s
∗)}K , which is a
contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3. I prove here that limǫ→0+(lim supk→∞Pσ∗(R
Bk
σ∗ > 1 − ǫ|0, s)) = 0, and
the second equality would follow from an analogous argument. Suppose the equality does not
hold, then s ∈ (s∗, s
∗) and ρ > 0 exist such that for any ǫ > 0 and any N ∈ N, k > N exists
such that Pσ∗(R
Bk
σ∗ > 1− ǫ|0, s) > ρ. Consider any realized decision sequence hǫ from Bk that,
together with s, induces some r > 1− ǫ, and let Hǫ denote the set of all such decision sequences;
thus, we know that
Pσ∗(hǫ|θ
′)fθ′(s)
Pσ∗(hǫ|θ)fθ(s) + Pσ∗(hǫ|θ′)fθ′(s)
= r
∑
hǫ∈Hǫ
Pσ∗(hǫ|θ) > ρ.
The above two conditions imply that
1 ≥
∑
hǫ∈Hǫ
Pσ∗(hǫ|θ
′) >
(1− ǫ)ρfθ(s)
ǫfθ′(s)
.
For sufficiently small ǫ, we have (1−ǫ)ρfθ(s)
ǫf
θ′(s)
> 1, which is a contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 4. Without loss of generality, assume that rˆ ∈ (0, r). We know that there
is a private signal s and an action sequence h from Bk such that
r =
Pσ∗(h|1)f1(s)
Pσ∗(h|1)f1(s) + Pσ∗(h|0)f0(s)
.
Consider h ∪ {ak+1} where ak+1 = 0. The new belief would then be
r1 =
Pσ∗(h|1)f1(s)× Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 1)
Pσ∗(h|1)f1(s)× Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 1) + Pσ∗(h|0)f0(s)× Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 0)
.
Note that
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 1) = F1(−s
k+1
∗ ) + Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, observe|h, 1)
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 0) = F0(−s
k+1
∗ ) + Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, observe|h, 0),
and that
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, observe|h, 1) =
∫ sk+1∗
−sk+1∗
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, |h, 1, sk+1)f1(sk+1)dsk+1
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, observe|h, 0) =
∫ sk+1∗
−sk+1∗
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, |h, 0, sk+1)f0(sk+1)dsk+1.
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In any equilibrium, note that Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, |h, 1, sk+1) = Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, |h, 0, sk+1) for any given
h and sk+1 ∈ [−s
k+1
∗ , s
k+1
∗ ]. Moreover, given any sk+1 ∈ [0, s
k+1
∗ ], Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, |h, 1, sk+1) and
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, |h, 0, sk+1) are either 0 or 1.
For any sk+1 ∈ [0, s
k+1
∗ ], note that in a symmetric equilibrium, agent k + 1 observes the
same neighborhood, given private signal sk+1 and −sk+1. Hence, if k + 1 chooses 1 with
private signal −sk+1, then he will also choose 1 with private signal sk+1; if k + 1 chooses 0
with private signal sk+1, then he will also choose 0 with private signal −sk+1. Together with
the assumptions of symmetric signal structure and the MLRP, which imply that f1(−sk+1) =
f0(sk+1) ≤ f1(sk+1) = f0(−sk+1), it then follows that
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, |h, 1, sk+1)f1(sk+1) + Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, |h, 1,−sk+1)f1(−sk+1)
≤Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, |h, 0, sk+1)f0(sk+1) + Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, |h, 0,−sk+1)f0(−sk+1).
Therefore, we have Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, observe|h, 0) ≥ Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, observe|h, 1). Together with
Lemma 1, we have
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 1)
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 0)
≤
F1(s
k+1
∗ )
F0(s
k+1
∗ )
<
F1(s
∗)
F0(s∗)
< 1.
The second inequality is based on the fact that F1(s
∗) − F1(−s
∗) = F0(s
∗) − F0(−s
∗) by the
symmetry of the signal structure. Therefore, we have
r
r1
=
1 + Pσ∗(h|0)f0(s)Pσ∗(h|1)f1(s)
Pσ∗(ak+1=0|h,0)
Pσ∗(ak+1=0|h,1)
1 + Pσ∗(h|0)f0(s)Pσ∗(h|1)f1(s)
= r + (1− r)
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 0)
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 1)
> r + (1− r)
F0(s
∗)
F1(s∗)
.
Note that the expression on the right-hand side above is decreasing in r. Let rm denote the
belief induced by h ∪ {ak+1, · · · , ak+m} where ak+1 = · · · = ak+m = 0. We have
rm = r ×
r1
r
× · · · ×
rm
rm−1
< r × (
r1
r
)m.
Because r1
r
= 1
r+(1−r)
F0(s
∗)
F1(s
∗)
< 1, we can find the desired N(r, rˆ) for any rˆ ∈ (0, r), such that
a realized belief that is less than rˆ can be induced by s and h ∪ {ak+1, · · · , ak+N(r,rˆ)}, where
ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(r,rˆ) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose not, then noting that PBkσ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s) must be weakly decreasing
in k, it follows that limk→∞P
Bk
σ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s) > 0. Let ρ > 0 denote this limit. From Lemma 3, we
know that for any α > 0 and for either true state θ = 0, 1, z ∈ [12 , 1) exists such that M ∈ N
exists such that max{Pσ∗(R
Bk
σ∗ > z|0, s),Pσ∗ (1−R
Bk
σ∗ > z|1, s)} < α for any k > M . Let α =
1
2ρ,
then we have max{Pσ∗(R
Bk
σ∗ > z|0, s),Pσ∗ (1−R
Bk
σ∗ > z|1, s)} <
1
2ρ for any k > M . Then, for any
δ > 0, we can find a sufficiently large k such that for any k′ ≥ k, (1) P
B
k′
σ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s) ∈ (ρ, ρ+ δ)
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and (2) max{Pσ∗(R
B
k′
σ∗ > z|0, s),Pσ∗ (1−R
B
k′
σ∗ > z|1, s)} <
1
2ρ. Hence, we have
f0(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
Pσ∗(R
B
k′
σ∗ ∈ [
1
2
, z]|0, s) +
f1(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
Pσ∗(1−R
B
k′
σ∗ ∈ [
1
2
, z]|1, s)
=P
B
k′
σ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s)−
f0(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
Pσ∗(R
B
k′
σ∗ > z|0, s) −
f1(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
Pσ∗(1−R
B
k′
σ∗ > z|1, s) >
1
2
ρ
By Lemma 3, for any π > 0, N(π) = max{N(z, 12+π ), N(1−z, 1−
1
2+π )} ∈ N exists such that
whenever θ = 0 and RBkσ∗ ∈ [
1
2 , z] or θ = 1 and 1 − R
Bk
σ∗ ∈ [
1
2 , z], additional N(π) observations
can reverse an incorrect decision. Consider the following (sub-optimal) updating method for
a rational agent who observes Bk′ = Bk+N(π): switch her action from 1 to 0 if and only if
R
Bk
σ∗ ∈ [
1
2 , z], and ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0; switch her action from 0 to 1 if and only if
1−RBkσ∗ ∈ [
1
2 , z], and ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 1. Let h denote a decision sequence from Bk that,
together with s, induces such a posterior belief in the former case, and let h′ denote a decision
sequence from Bk that, together with s, induces such a posterior belief in the latter case. Let
H and H ′ denote the sets of such decision sequences correspondingly. We have
PBkσ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s)− P
B
k′
σ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s)
≥
∑
h∈H
(
f0(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
Pσ∗(h, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|0)
−
f1(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
Pσ∗(h, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|1))
+
∑
h′∈H′
(
f1(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
Pσ∗(h
′, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 1|1)
−
f0(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
Pσ∗(h
′, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 1|0)).
From the proof of Lemma 4, we know that for every h,
Pσ∗(h, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|0)f0(s)
Pσ∗(h, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|0)f0(s) + Pσ∗(h, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|1)f1(s)
≥
1 + π
2 + π
,
which implies that
Pσ∗(h, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|0)f0(s)− Pσ∗(h, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|1)f1(s)
≥πf1(s)Pσ∗(h, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 0|1)
≥πf1(s)F1(−s
∗)N(π)Pσ∗(h|1).
By the definition of h, we have
1
2
≤
Pσ∗(h|1)f1(s)
Pσ∗(h|1)f1(s) + Pσ∗(h|0)f0(s)
≤ z,
which implies that
Pσ∗(h|1)f1(s) ≥ Pσ∗(h|0)f0(s).
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Similarly, we have
Pσ∗(h
′, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 1|1)f1(s)− Pσ∗(h
′, ak+1 = · · · = ak+N(π) = 1|0)f0(s)
≥πf0(s)(1− F0(s
∗))N(π)Pσ∗(h
′|0) = πf0(s)F1(−s
∗)N(π)Pσ∗(h
′|0),
and
Pσ∗(h
′|0)f0(s) ≥ Pσ∗(h
′|1)f1(s).
From the previous construction, we know that
f0(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
∑
h∈H
Pσ∗(h|0) +
f1(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
∑
h′∈H′
Pσ∗(h
′|1)
=
f0(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
Pσ∗(R
B
k′
σ∗ ∈ [
1
2
, z]|0, s) +
f1(s)
f0(s) + f1(s)
Pσ∗(1−R
B
k′
σ∗ ∈ [
1
2
, z]|1, s) >
1
2
ρ.
Combining the previous inequalities, we have
PBkσ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s)− P
B
k′
σ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s)
>πF1(−s
∗)N(π)
1
2
ρ.
From the previous construction, we also know that
PBkσ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s)− P
B
k′
σ∗ (aˆ 6= θ|s) < δ.
Clearly, for some given π > 0, a sufficiently small δ exists such that πF1(−s
∗)N(π) 12ρ > δ, which
implies a contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 2. Lemma 2 has already shown that maximal learning occurs in every
equilibrium only if the capacity structure has infinite observations. Now I prove the sufficiency
of infinite observations for maximal learning in every equilibrium. Note that in any equilibrium
σ∗, for any n and any sn ∈ (−s
n
∗ , s
n
∗ ),
Pσ∗(an = θ|sn) ≥ P
BK(n)
σ∗ (an = θ|sn).
When the capacity structure has infinite observations, i.e., limn→∞K(n) =∞, by Lemma 5 we
know that
lim
n→∞
P
BK(n)
σ∗ (an = θ|sn) = 1,
and thus
lim
n→∞
Pσ∗(an = θ|sn) = 1,
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which further implies that
lim
n→∞
Pσ∗(an = θ) =
1
2
F0(s∗) +
1
2
(1− F1(s∗)) = P
∗(c).
Therefore, maximal learning occurs in every equilibrium.
Proof of Corollary 2. To apply the argument for Theorem 2 without the symmetry assump-
tion, it suffices to show that for any agent n and any observed action sequence h in neighborhood
{1, · · · , n − 1}, Pσ∗(an = 0|h, 0) − Pσ∗(an = 0, |h, 1) and Pσ∗(an = 1|h, 1) − Pσ∗(an = 1, |h, 0)
are both positive and bounded away from zero.
Note that
Pσ∗(an = 0|h, 0) > F0(s∗)
Pσ∗(an = 0|h, 1) < F1(s
∗)
Pσ∗(an = 1|h, 1) > 1− F1(s
∗)
Pσ∗(an = 1|h, 0) < 1− F0(s∗).
Hence, we have
Pσ∗(an = 0|h, 0) − Pσ∗(an = 0, |h, 1) > F0(s∗)− F1(s
∗)
Pσ∗(an = 1|h, 1) − Pσ∗(an = 1, |h, 0) > F0(s∗)− F1(s
∗).
Therefore, the assumption F0(s∗) > F1(s
∗) suffices for the above two differences to be
positive and bounded away from zero.
Proof of Corollary 3. Again, it suffices to show that for any agent n with K(n) = 1 or
K(n) = n − 1 and any observed action sequence h in neighborhood {1, · · · , n − 1}, Pσ∗(an =
0|h, 0) − Pσ∗(an = 0, |h, 1) and Pσ∗(an = 1|h, 1) − Pσ∗(an = 1, |h, 0) are both positive and
bounded away from zero.
Note that whenK(n) = 1 orK(n) = n−1, n’s observed neighborhood (whenever she chooses
to observe) is the same regardless of her signal. When K(n) = 1, she observes the predecessor
with the largest probability of taking the correct action; when K(n) = n − 1, she observes
the entire set of predecessors. Hence, given any observed action sequence h in neighborhood
{1, · · · , n− 1}, there must be a signal s′(h) ∈ (s∗, s
∗) such that n will choose action 1 if sn > s
′
and 0 if sn < s
′. Hence, by MLRP we know that
Pσ∗(an = 0|h, 0) − Pσ∗(an = 0, |h, 1) = Pσ∗(an = 1|h, 1) − Pσ∗(an = 1, |h, 0)
= F0(s
′(h)) − F1(s
′(h)) > F0(s
∗)− F1(s
∗) > 0.
Therefore, the above two differences are positive and bounded away from zero.
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Proof of Proposition 4. Let β¯ = lims→1
f1(s)
f0(s)+f1(s)
and β = lims→−1
f1(s)
f0(s)+f1(s)
. Let ∆ =
β(1−β¯)
−β+β¯+2β(1−β¯)
∈ (0, 1). Acemoglu et al. (2011) have shown that when agents have bounded
private beliefs and when each agent observes all her predecessors, the learning probability of
any agent is bounded above by max{∆, 1 −∆} < 1, i.e., P ∗(σ∗(0)) ≤ max{∆, 1−∆} < 1.
Note that for any ǫ ∈ (0, 1), c′ > 0 exists such that agents have strong private beliefs under
c′, and that F0(s
∗)− F0(−s
∗) = F1(s
∗)− F1(−s
∗) = 1− ǫ (due to symmetry and continuity of
signal distributions). The capacity structure K(n) = n − 1 has infinite observations; thus, by
Theorem 2, maximal learning occurs in any equilibrium σ∗(c′), which implies that
lim
n→∞
Pσ∗(c′)(an = θ) = F0(s
∗)− F0(−s
∗) + F0(−s
∗) = F0(s
∗) > 1− ǫ.
Let ǫ = 1−max{∆, 1 −∆} ∈ (0, 1), then c′ exists such that P ∗(σ∗(0)) < P ∗(σ∗(c′)) in any
equilibrium σ∗(c′). Again, by continuity of the signal distributions, the desired c¯, c exist.
Proof of Proposition 5. Let (F0, F1) and (G0, G1) denote two (symmetric) signal structures
that both generate strong private beliefs, and let s∗F and s
∗
G be the positive private signals such
that an agent is indifferent between paying c to know the true state and not paying c and acting
according to the signal. Assume that (F0, F1) has higher signal strength: F0(−s
∗
F )+1−F0(s
∗
F ) >
G0(−s
∗
G) + 1 − G0(s
∗
G). We already know that for any equilibrium σ
∗
F under the first signal
structure and for any equilibrium σ∗G under the second signal structure,
lim
n→∞
Pσ∗
F
(an = θ) = F0(s
∗
F )
lim
n→∞
Pσ∗
G
(an = θ) = G0(s
∗
G).
Hence, when G0(s
∗
G) > F0(s
∗
F ), the signal structure with higher strength will lead to lower
limit learning probability.
Proof of Proposition 6. Part (a) follows from Theorem 1. When c(1) > 0, it is clear that
asymptotic learning does not occur in any equilibrium. When c(1) = 0, we know that in any
equilibrium σ∗, the probability of taking the right action Pσ∗(an = θ) is weakly increasing in
n. Suppose that asymptotic learning does not occur in σ∗, then Pσ∗(an = θ) must converge
to a limit in (0, 1). Then the argument in the proof for Theorem 1 can be applied to derive a
contradiction.
Part (b) follows from Theorem 2. By Theorem 2, maximal learning requires infinite obser-
vations as n grows large. When c(m + 1) − c(m) = 0 for all m ≥ 1, it is clear that maximal
learning occurs in every equilibrium. When c(m+1)−c(m) > 0 for some m, in any equilibrium,
consider the case when an agent receives a private signal that makes her indifferent between not
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observing and paying c(1) to know the true state. We know that such a private signal exists
because by assumption, private beliefs are unbounded, signal distributions are continuous and
c(1) > 0. Since c(m+1)− c(m) > 0 for some m, the cost of observing infinitely many actions is
strictly higher than c(1), and hence the agent will choose not to observe, regardless of her capac-
ity of observation. Because signal distributions are continuous, there exists a positive measure
of signals given which the agent will choose not to observe. Therefore, maximal learning does
not occur in any equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 7. “Only if”: assume that n does not exist. Then no agent will observe
and clearly asymptotic learning does not occur in any equilibrium.
“If”: the condition implies that agent n will observe K(n) of her predecessors. Then,
beginning with n, observing will be weakly better than not observing for each agent because
an agent can at least observe agent n and achieve exactly the same expected payoff as agent n.
Then, the argument for Theorem 1 can be applied to show that asymptotic learning occurs in
every equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 8. “Only if”: see the proof of Theorem 2.
“If”: since the capacity structure has infinite observations, we can construct a sequence of
agents {im}
∞
m=1 such that K(im) ≤ K(im+1) for any m, and limm→∞K(im) = ∞. It thus
suffices to show that maximal learning occurs in this sequence of agents.
Denote s¯im∗ and s
im
∗ as the positive and negative private signals such that agent im is in-
different between observing and not observing (when either of such private signals does not
exist, let s¯im∗ or s
im
∗ be the private signal such that im is indifferent between choosing 1 and 0).
Clearly, both s¯im∗ and s
im
∗ converge. Denote s¯ and s as the corresponding limits. We know that
for any m, F0(s
im
∗ )− F1(s
im
∗ ) ≥ F0(s)− F1(s) > 0. Let ǫ =
1
2(F0(s)− F1(s)), and find M ∈ N
+
such that for any m ≥M , F1(s
im
∗ )− F1(s) < ǫ.
For anym ≥M , denote a random variable Z(im) = 1{im chooses 0 without any observation}.
We know that Z(iM ), Z(iM+1), · · · are mutually independent, and that for any m ≥M , Z(im)
is equal to 1 with probability greater than F0(s) when θ = 0 and with probability less than
F1(s) + ǫ =
1
2 (F0(s) + F1(s)) < F0(s) when θ = 1.
By the weak law of large numbers, for any ρ > 0, we have
lim
n→∞
Prob(
∑M+n
m=M Z(im)
n+ 1
< F0(s)− ρ|θ = 0) = 0
lim
n→∞
Prob(
∑M+n
m=M Z(im)
n+ 1
>
1
2
(F0(s) + F1(s)) + ρ|θ = 1) = 0.
Take ρ < 12(F0(s) − F1(s)), and consider the following sub-optimal strategy for any agent im,
m > M : observe the neighborhood {M,M+1, · · · ,M+n} where n = min{m−1−M,K(im)−1}.
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Choose 0 if
∑
M+n
m=M Z(im)
n+1 ≥ F0(s) − ρ, and 1 otherwise. By the above two conditions, we know
that the probability of making the right choice converges to 1 under either state when the
agent’s number of observations approaches infinity. Hence, maximal learning occurs.
Proof of Proposition 9. For all i ∈ {1, · · · ,M}, let sˆi denote the positive private signal that
will make an agent indifferent between her private beliefs and the most extreme belief induced
by Ci, i.e., sˆ
i is characterized by
max
yk for all k∈Ci
Pσ∗(θ = 0|ak = yk for all k ∈ Ci) =
f1(sˆ
i)
f1(sˆi) + f0(sˆi)
.
Let sˆ = maxi sˆi < 1. Let Xn denote the event that agent n can only observe within some Ci,
i ∈ {1, · · · ,M}; let Yn denote the event that agent n can observe within {1, · · · , n − 1}.
Consider the term
Pσ∗(ak+1=0|h,1)
Pσ∗(ak+1=0|h,0)
in the proof of Lemma 3. It can now be written as
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 1)
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 0)
=
ǫnPσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 1,Xk+1) + (1− ǫn)Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 1, Yk+1)
ǫnPσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 0,Xk+1) + (1− ǫn)Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 0, Yk+1)
.
We know that Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 1, Yk+1) ≤ Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 0, Yk+1). Thus, we have
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 1)
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 0)
≤
ǫnPσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 1,Xk+1) + (1− ǫn)Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 0, Yk+1)
ǫnPσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 0,Xk+1) + (1− ǫn)Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 0, Yk+1)
≤
ǫnPσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 1,Xk+1) + (1− ǫn)
ǫnPσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 0,Xk+1) + (1− ǫn)
.
By an argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 3, we also have
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, observe|h, 1,Xk+1) ≤ Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, observe|h, 0,Xk+1)
which implies that
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 1)
Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0|h, 0)
≤
ǫn(Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, not observe|h, 1,Xk+1) + Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, observe|h, 0,Xk+1)) + (1− ǫn)
ǫn(Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, not observe|h, 0,Xk+1) + Pσ∗(ak+1 = 0, observe|h, 0,Xk+1)) + (1− ǫn)
≤
ǫnF1(sˆ) + (1− ǫn)
ǫnF0(sˆ) + (1− ǫn)
≤
ǫF1(sˆ) + (1− ǫ)
ǫF0(sˆ) + (1− ǫ)
< 1.
The argument for Theorem 2 can then be applied at this juncture to prove that if limn→∞K(n) =
∞, limn→∞Pσ∗(an = θ|Yn) = 1. Therefore, we have
lim inf
n→∞
Pσ∗(an = θ) ≥ (1− ǫ) lim
n→∞
Pσ∗(an = θ|Yn) = 1− ǫ.
Hence, ǫ-maximal learning occurs.
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